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Da vid A . Skeel, Jr.*

INTROD U CTION

To paraphrase a recent men's aftershave commercial, tak eovers
are back. Few expect the resurgence to reach 1980s leve ls, b ut merger
activity clearly is on the rise again. 1 The widely followed Paramo unt
Communications, In c. v. Q V C Network, Inc. 2 decision prominently reflect ed this recent shift. After earlier suggesting, in Paramo unt Com munications, In c. v. Time, Inc. ,3 that directors have almost comple te
discretion in responding to a takeover bid, Delaware now has made
clear that the directors of a corporation that is a takeover targe t4 cannot simply stonewall one suitor in favor of another, in an opinion that
appears to breathe life back into the takeover-friendly Delaware decisions of the mid 1980s .5
A crucial issue in Paramount, and one that almost certainly will
increase in importance if the recent propensity for negotiated mergers
continues, is courts ' treatment of lockup provisions granted by a target's managers to a bidder. A lockup is a provision pursuant to which
a target promises to compensate the bidder if their proposed sale fa lls
* Associa te P rofesso r o f La w, Templ e U ni ve rsity. I am grate ful to A lice Ab reu , G eo rge
Cohen, D ebo rah DeMott, Stephe n Fraidin, Jon H anson , M a rcel Kahan, M icha e l Klausn e r, B o b
R asmusse n, E d R ock, and the part icipa nts a t a workshop at th e No rthw este rn U ni ve rsit y Schoo l
of Law fo r help ful co mments on ea rli er dra fts. Fin ancial suppo rt for this research was pro vid e d
by th e Tem ple U ni vers it y School of Law.
1 See, e. g , Ste ven Li pin , Ai ergers and A cquisitions in First Quarter In creased 35 % fro m rhe
Year Before, W A LL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1995 , at A 3; R andall Smith & Greg Steinme tz , Ofj w the Races:
Mergers Surge as Firms Find a Rising Econom y and Cheap Financing, W AL L ST . J., M a r. 16,
1994, at Al; News R o un du p, Big Is Back in Sry /e as Corp orate America D eals, Buys and i\Ierges ,
W A L L ST. L Aug. 4, 1994, at Al.
2 637 A .2d 34 ( D e l. 1994).
3 571 A.2 d 1140 (D el. 1989).
4 The te rm ''bid de r" will be used throughout the Article to denote an ind ivid ua l o r co rpo rati on seekin g to acq uire ano th e r corporation , which will be referr ed to as the " ta rge t," e ithe r
through a negoti at ed m e rge r, a ten de r offe r, or by other m eans .
5 Th e effect of Para m ount v. Q V C itse lf should no t be overstated . l n a subse q uent ta keove r
decision , the D ela ware Su prem e Court uph eld man age ri al defensive tacti cs. Un itrin, Inc. v.
A merica n G en. Corp ., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). Yet Param ount m ade cle ar th a t the re still are
li m its to ta rget directo rs' ability to thwart a take over. Moreo ve r, the res urge nce in ta ke ove rs
tha t began shortl y before Param ount has continue d.

564

90:564 (1996)

Corporate Lockups

through. 6 Traditionally, courts have been skeptical of lockups, fearing, among other things, rnanagerial self-dealing-that the managers
of a target firm will make exorbitant concessions in return for special
treatment for themselves in connection with the transaction. As a result, courts have scrutinized lockups on an ad hoc basis, enforcing
those that appear reasonable and striking down those that do notJ
vVhile commentators have proposed various ways to simplify the scru··
tiny, nearly all have called for some kind of winnowing process that
upholds some lockups but not others:''
In a provocative and ambitious recent article, "Toward Unlocking
Lockups," 9 Stephen Fraidin and Jon Hanson insist that the conventional approach to lockups is wholly misguided. Fraidin and H anson
contend that there is no reason to strike down a lockup arrangement
unless it both provides excessive compensation to the recipient
("lockup") bidder and forecloses other, higher valuing bidders from
bidding for the target.l 0 In their view, the managers of a target have
every reason to seek out the highest possible bidder. But even if they
did not, and were inclined to act disloyally, the managers simply cannot prevent the highest valuing bidder from ending up with the target.
A higher valuing bidder will either outbid the lockup bidder or, if the
lockup is so excessive that it prevents this, will make a deal with the
lockup bidder as soon as the lockup bidder has acquired the target. 11
Based on their view that lockups will not prevent the best bidder from
winning, Fraidin and Hanson conclude that courts should enforce
every lockup, without exception.
As this brief description suggests, Fraidin and Hanson's analysis
can be seen as a straightforward application to corporate lockups of
6 Throughout the Article, I use the term "lockup" broadly, intending to encompass any
provision that has this effect, including stock option agreements ("stock lockups"), options to
purchase specified assets ("asset lockups"), and termination or breakup fees. "Lockup" can be a
misnomer, since the provision may, but also may not, make it prohibitively expensive for other
parties to try to bid on the target, thus locking up the deal between the target and a bidder.
7 For descriptions of some of the Delaware lockup cases, see infra note 93.
8 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Analyzing SiOck Lock-ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 CoLUtvl. L. REv. 682 (1990) (court scrutiny of lockups that clearly
"overinsure" the bidder); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-ups in
Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REv. 239 (1990)(favoring presumptively striking
down lockups involving more than 10% of target's stock unless they are preceded by an auction); see also Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siege!, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of
Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 315 (1987).
9 Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739
(1994).
10 !d. at 1784. I have borrowed the term "lockup bidder" from a new article by Marcel
Kahan and Michael Klausner. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for
Control (July 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Northwestern University Law
Review).
11 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1788-89.
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TI1e Article begins by
lockups. It focus es in
pa.nicular on Fraidin and H anson's optlinistic view of the effec t of a
J.os.1m p provision, both because cheir analysis suggests important new
insights as to the nature of lockups, and because it offers a useful vehicle for assessing the benefits lockups offer and the concerns they r aise.
D rawing extensively from contract theory and doctrine, the Article then sketches an alternative approach to lockups, which is referred
to as a "reliance damages model." Like the conventional view of lockups, and unlike Fraidin and Hanson's perspective, this model relies on
court scrutiny of lockups to distinguish between those that should, and
those that should not, be enforced. The model diverges from previous
commentary, hmvever, in that it focuses on a bidder's reliance interest
rather than its expectancy or the generai "reasonableness" of the
lock up, and in the model's contention that a bi dder should be entitled
to prove its actual damages if its lockup provision is struck down.
1ne analogy to contract law is an obvious one. As any first-year
Con~racts s~udent -vvould recognize, and as courts and commentators
frequ ently point out,B lockups are closely analogous to the liquidated
damages provisions used in other contract settings. Yet, prior to Fraidin a:nd :Hanson, commentators had largely neglected the extensive
hteratu-ce and case law on liquidated damages and other contract issue3 once they actually began to analyze corporate lockups. 14 This
11 See Ronald H. Coase, Th e Problem of Social Cos/, 3 J.L & EcoN. 1 (1960). One of the
iwnies of this classic article is that Coase not only does not explicitl y art icula te what has come to
be known as the "Coase Theorem," but he also inte nd ed to focus more on the importance of
trr-nsaction costs than on the efficacy of private ordering in their absence. For a fascinating
exploration of the Coase Theorem and some of its limitations, see Robert Cooter, The Cost of
Coase, 11 J. LEG AL STuD. 1 (1982); see also Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer!
Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlem ent Allocation, 46 STAN. L REv. 663
(199t:-)(arguing that offer/asking price gaps may undermine Coase's invariance proposition).
13 See, e.g., QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (DeL C h.
1993 ), ajf'd, 637 A.2d 34 (DeL 1994) ($100 million terrnination fee is a "fair liquidated amoun t to
cove r [the bidder's] expenses should the ... merger not be consummated"); Bainbridge, supra
note 8, at 286.
14 Ian Ayres's art icie on lock ups is both an exception to and an illustration of this point.
Ayres, supra note 8. Ayres is a prominent cont racts scholar in addition to his work in corporate
law, and his analysis of the "insurance" effects of lockup provi sions tracks an aspect of th e eco-
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Article takes the insights of contract theory and law in a di:fferem, and
in my view compelling, direction.
Part I of the Article reviews several of the benefits that Fraidin
and Hanson and o ther commentators attribute to lockups. Th e Article then shifts to the dark side of lockups and demonstrates in Part H
th at despite t heir apparent incen tive to gra nt only appropriate Iocku ps, even "loya l" m an agers of a target rna y neverthe less offer an excessivc lockup clu e to mistake or collusion. Part In s.rgues that
Fraidin and H ansGn's conclusion that Coasian bar g2jnir:g ·:;vcu kl Dievent lockups from foreclosing higher valuing bi dd~rs is rnistaken ~a nd
·wou ld pose serious process problems for corp orate decisionmak ing
even if it were not. After briefly considering th e possi bility of invalidating all lockups. the final P art proposes and exarn.ines 1.ny reliance
damages model.
T
i.

T HE BENEFITS OF LOCKU PS

T he suggestion that lockups can serve a beneficial role in corporate acquisitions is noncontroversial-nearly all of the commentators
agree that lockups may offer important benefits. This Part begins by
assessing Fraidin and Hanson's account of lockup benefits because
Fraidin and H anson challenge conventional explanations as to what
these arrangements can and cannot do , and because the relative importance and p lausibility of the benefits will play an im portant role in
our consideration of the very different reliance damages approach to
lockups proposed in P art IV.1 s

A.

Traditional Justifications: Co mpensation for the Costs of Bidding

Commentators traditionally have justifi ed lockups as a means of
compensating a bidder for the costs it incurs in bidding. Th.ese costs
can be viewed as comprising two kinds of expenses: first, the costs to
the bidder of its initial investigation and the negotiations leading up to
an agreement with the target and second, the costs a bidder faces after
the agr eement has been signed, during the inevitable delay in consummating the agreement. 16 A bidder's post-bid costs include the risk
nomic lite ratur e on contracts to some ex tent, but Ay res mak es few explicit connections to con tract law and theory.
15 The analysis that follows assesses all but two of th e benefits that Fraidin and H anson
discuss. I consider collusive con tractin g in section II.B.2, and I omi t direct discussion of th eir
critique of pre vious commentators' views of lockups as comp ensa tio n for target breach beca use
th is ana lysis closely tracks th e ir contenti on th a t lockups a re unli ke ly eve r to foreclose a highe r
valuing bidde r, a conclusion I chall enge in subpart III.A.
16 Once a bidder has signed a merger agreement with th e targe t's manage rs, the agreement
ordi naril y must be vo ted on by th e targ et's sha reholders, whi ch tak es a mi nimum of 20 days and
usuall y s ubst antially longe r. See, e.g., D EL CooE A NN. tit 8, § 25l(c) (Supp. 1995). Simi larly, if
th e bidder makes a tend e r offe r directly to the target shareholders, th e Williams A ct re qu ires
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commenta tors have argued , a target can encourage the bidder to incur
the expens e of bidding and properly compensate it for its losse s in the
event the deal su bsequently faUs through. 17
Fraidin ancl Hanson dismiss the conventional view as implausibl e
,-1
..
.
w1tn respect to tne nrst type C'i: (_;osts--pre-blu costs- due to a logica l
inconsis tencv thev de tect in t he exulanation . Hmvever a cor om ~at e a
1.
.
podcy 1t may be to encourage OldG mg uy prormsmg to rerrno 1Jrse a
bidder's costs, lockups are unl.ik elv to serve this ourpose bec;:ws e
r ,
"j
r
' . , l
.
d '
.
. .,
targets d_ ~) not gran·\. tr1err1 tlrl'l: l.l a.rler a OlGLer a1rea y .nas 111Ct..tr r ~:>J tne
costs. 1 s T he argument has obvious force, but it is far fr o:m fated w the
traditiona l view. Loclmps still may play some role, even 'Nit h respect
to already incurred costs, if lo cku ps are sufficiently prevalent !hat a
bidder can expect to rece ive one if it reaches agreement with the target. In such a regime , a bidder could insist on a lockup as a prerequisite to entering into any agreement. Moreover, to the extent a lockup
might plausibly com pensate a bidder for anticipated post-bid costs, as
I argue below, a bidder is likely also to insist that the lockup cover
previo us ly incurred expenses.
Fraidin and Hanson 's dismissal of the second half of the traditional justification - that lockups compensate a bidder fo r the risks it
faces due to nost-bid delay--is even more moblematic. Fraidin and
Hanson allude to the costs that a bidder may incur during this period
of time, but then consider only the risk that the merger may become
"unattractive" to the bidder during the lagtime before its consummation.19 Th ev ignore the more obvious risk that the bidder mav face
costs, such as the expenses of conducting additional investigation and
devoting further executi ve time to the transaction, in connection. with
a merger that remains every bit as attractive as it was initially. Lockups serve as an excellen t means of reimbursing the lockup b idder for
the costs it will incur if a new bidder emerges and the lockup bidder
contests (but loses to, thus triggering the lockup) the new bid because
it 'Nould :rather not abando n the transaction.
1
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Counteracting Uncerta inty: Differi ng Expectations and
Risk Aversion

In contrast to their skepticism about the conventional justifications for lockups, Fraidin and H anson view lockups as a desirable
that it be kept open at !east 20 da ys, and extended at least 10 additional days aft er any sign ificant
change in the offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14e-1 (1993).
17 Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 242.
18 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1815.
19 Jd. at 1816 -1 7.
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means of facilitating agreement when the costs of uncertainty might
otherwise scuttle the deal. In particular, if a bidder and target have
different expectations about the likely outcome of an auction, or if
one party is risk averse, a lockup can increase the likelihood that the
parties will come to terms on a mutually beneficial sale .2 o
To appreciate Fraidin an d Hanson's point about differing expectations, assume tha t a bidder is willing to pay $1.50 fo r the target, bu t
believes that another bidder would go as high as $175 in an open auction. In contrast, the target's managers, who would accept any offer
that exceeded $100, suspect that no other bidder valu es it at more
than $125, and that this. is what aE auction would bring. On these
facts, both parties wo uld benefit if the target's managers agreed to sell
the firm to the initi al bidder for $150, and gave the bidder an enforceable lockup in order to protect it against the emergence of the higher
bidder it fears. A bsent the lockup, the deal might fall through due to
the initial bidder's unwillingness to enter a bidding contest it expects
to lose.
It is at least plausible that this account may accord with the dynamic of actual transactions. Target firms often negotiate privately
with several possible bidders, and a bidder may well know which other
firms the target has spoken to. 21 If the target's discussions persuade it
that the initial bidder values it most, but this bidder's knowledge of
the other firms leads it to suspect otherwise, both parties may benefit
from a negotiated merger and lockup agreement. Yet it seems questionable whether differing expectations are iikely to be the sole, or
even the primary, impetus for a lockup in any given case, due to the
signalling problems they may create. A bidder who suspects that the
target is willing to agree to a lockup due to its pessimistic view of the
likely outcome of an auction may decide to lower its bid. Similarly, a
target dealing with a pessimistic bidder has an incentive to conduct an

20 !d. at 1822 (diffe ring expectations); id. at 1823 (risk av e rsion).
21 The contest to acquire G rumman Indust ri es in Spring 1994 illustrates this po int. Martin

Marietta entered into a merger ag reement with G rumm an, but subsequ ently dropped o ut when
Northrop (who, as Martin Marietta well kn ew, had previou sly engaged in me rger discussions
with Grumman) mad e a hi ghe r bid. See, e.g., Jeff Cole, Northrop Seeks Grumman in HosTile
$2.04 Billion Bid-Deal Ser Earlier in Week wirh Martin Marietta Is Topped by $5 a Share, WALL
ST. J. , Mar. 11, 1994, at A3. If Martin Marietta (which la ter m e rged with Lockheed) was in fact
the highes t bidde r and mistakenl y th o ught it wo uld lose a bidding con test to Northrop , Grum·
man th eo retically could have granted Ma rtin Marietta a large lockup in re turn for a high bid. (In
actuality, Grumman g ra nted a re lative ly small , $50 million termination fee .) In fact, Martin Ma rietta 's apparent refusa l ever to engage in auctio ns the ore tically wo uld have made th is use of a
lockup valuable to any target whose managers believed that Martin Marietta was the highes t
valuing bidder. On th e other ha nd , if Ma rtin Marietta was nor th e high est valuing bidd er and the
lockup e ffectiv ely precl uded better bidd ers, th e lockup would have a malignant rather than ben eficia! effect. Part III of this A rticle discusses th ese kinds of problems.
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additional search for other, higher valuing bidders if the target is able
to de tect the bidder's pessimism. 22
Fraidin and H anson also suggest that a lockup can prove benefici al if one or both of the parties is risk averse. If the bidder is risk
a.verse, the parties can agree to a lockup that guarantees the bidder its
expected profits in the event a higher bidder appears, thus shifting the
un.cert::tinty as to the existence or amount of a higher bid to the targ~t.23 If the target rather than the bidder is risk a verse, a lockup could
"llSO be calibrated to assure that th e target receives a fixed return and
~: t1 2.t the bidder bears all of the risk. 24 As with differing expectations,
t \1 is account of locku ps is subj ect to significant questions on inspec~ion . Lockups seem better calibrated to address bidder risk aversion
(han ta rge t ris k aversion , for instance, and it is not clear why a bidder
·.,voulcl be more concerned about a merger deal that falls thro ugh than
the apparently m uch greater uncertainti es of a merger it actu ally consummates, as I discuss in somewhat greater detail below. 25 In short ,
diffe ring expectations and bidder risk aversion, while plausible, seem
less compelling than the more prosaic traditional justification for
lockups .
C.

Encouraging Search

Lockups can be viewed as encouraging search by bidders and
targets in a variety of ways. In a general sens e, if a regime that enforces lockups is preferable to one that does not, lockups will encourage search by each of the interested parties by increasing the
gains available from these kinds of transactions. 26
In addition to noting this generally beneficial effect on search,
Fraidin and H anson also argue that lockups can give bidders a substantial, direct incentive to engage in post-bid search. If the target
gives a bidder a lockup whose effect is to foreclose all other bidders,
that bidder its elf will benefit if it finds someone else who values the
target more than it does, since the bidder could consummate its
purchase of the target and then imm ediately resell the target at a
2 2 It is also interesting to note that the differing expectations ana lysis arguably is in tension
with the economic literature on settlements, which predicts that parties will often fail to reach
ag ree ment if they disagree about the likely outcome of litigation. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit,
Smlemem and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods fo r the Allocation of
Legal CoSlS , 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 55 (1982). My thanks to Geo rg e Cohen for bringing these issues
to my attention.
23 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1823. For an insightful ana lysis of the ways in which
coniract damages provisions can be used to a ll oca te ris k, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Ris k Sharing
Through Breach of Contract Remedies, 12 J. L E GAL STUD . 427 (1983).
24 Fraidin & Hanson, supra n ote 9, at 1823.
25 See infr a notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
26 See supra note 17 for a closely ana logous point.
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profi t. 27 In a sense, as the authors point out, the lockup gives the bidder an incentive to act as a sales agent with respect to the target firm ,
which may be desirable if the bidder has m ore information about the
relevant market than the target does. 2 8 On th e other hand, a lockup is
unn ecess ary for this purpose if the target is li kely to be a better seller
i:han the bidder would be, and it seems doubtful that targe ts would
grant a lockup with the bidder 's selling exp ertise in min d except on
rare occasions. 2 9 Moreover, even the ge nera l arg ument that honoring
lockups -..vill encourage search is more problematic than it initially appears. While lockups will encourage search to the exten t that target
managers grant lockups to unsolicited bidders, a target also can use a
lockuo to th·-.vart an unwanted offer bv grantin g the lock un to a favored bid der. 30 ~fh e possibility that lockups \vill be use d defensively
suggests that they sometimes may have a chilling effect on takeover
activity and thus undermine the incentive to search.
i

.I

D.

.........

,___,

1

Enhancing the Effectiveness of an Auction Process

One final benefit suggested by Fraidin and Hanson comes in the
context of an auction. In a common values auction-that is, an auction where the target is likely to hold roughly the same value to all
bidders 31-bidders may refrain from bidding for fear they will lose
money regardless of whether they win the auction. 32 Fraidin and Hanson suggest that, in such a context, a target can use a lockup as a
momise to reimburse a bidder for its costs in the event it loses the
auction, and thus as a means of encouraging an otherwise reluctant
bidder to enter an auction. 33 Despite several commentators' suggestions to the contrary, corporate acquisitions seem unlikely ever to
i

27 Frai di n & H ans o n ,

supra note 9, at 1788- 89.

2S !d. at 1827.

29 For an exam p le o f such an exceptional case , see In re KDI Co rp. Sh a re hold e rs Litig., No.

10,278, 1988 D el. C h. L E XIS 143 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988). In KDI, th e prin cipal shareholders o f
th e K DI co rpo rati o n (who held 49.5 % of th e stock) , agreed to tend e r their sha res into a bidde r 's
offer, pursuant to an agr eement that required the bidd e r to p ay th em 50 % of an y high e r price
t he bidde r receive d o n th e re sale of KDI within on e ye ar. !d.
30 See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 10.
31 See Pe te r Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using AuClion Th eory ro Inform Takeover Regulation , 7 J.L. E coN . & ORG. 27, 28-30 (1991) (describing "common values " and "inde pend ent
valu es " aucti ons) .
32 The problem is th a t, once it has incurred sunk costs investigating the target a nd pre paring
its bid , a bidde r !mows it loses these costs if it loses the au ction. The bidder th e refore will bid up
to the valu e of th e targe t, with o ut regard to its costs. If this bid win s, th e bidder still will ha ve
lost an am ount e qual to the amount of its costs. ! d. at 33.
33 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1829-30; cf Bruce A. Mark ell , Th e Cas e Againsr
Breakup Fees in Bankruprcy , 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (1 992 ) (questi o ning wheth e r brea kup o r
te rminatio n fe es a re n ece ssary to induce bidding in th e bankruptcy cont ex t).
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truly be a common values auction.34 But lockups offer similar b enefits
in the independent values context: in particular, lockups can help to
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This brief overvie\v of the role of lockups suggests that, despite its
limitations , the conventiona l view of lockups still seems to be the bes t
account of their benefi ts. Of the additional benefits postulated by
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E XCESS LVE DAMAG ES AND OTHER PRO B LE lviS -\i\fi-.CI-I }_,(_J,C l( lJPS

Lockups clearly can be used for beneficial purposes. The question, then, is will they be? If the parties invariably empl oy lockups in
an appropriate fashion, Fraidin and Hanson are justified in concluding
tha t there is no reason for courts to scrutinize them .
Previous commentators have argued that the managers of a target
firm suffer from serious conflict of interest problems, and as a result
will often grant excessive lockups as a means of privileging a favo red
bidderY Fraidin and Hanson question whether managers' incen tives
34 Cramton an d Schwartz suggest that takeover contests often will be a common vaiues auction if all bidders' principal obj ective is to replace th e targe t's existing managers. Cramton &
Schwartz, supra note 31 , a t 47. Even in this con text , however, different bidders ine vitabl y wo uld
imple ment diffe rent strategies and m ana gem ent personnel and thus a re like ly to va lue th e !arge t
d iffe rentl y.
If an auction was in fact comm on valu es, the target woul d do bett er w nego ti a te a merger
with a single bidder, rath e r th an to conduct an auction, since addin g bidders 'rio uid incr.:as':: cos ts
with o ut ge ne ra ting offsetting benefits. Delaware law limits a t arge t's abilit y to take ouch a tack,
du e to its bias toward auctions. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Auction Theo ry, MBOs and Prop ..
erry Righrs in Corporace Assers, 25 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 85 (1990).
3 5 I d. Notice that this reasoning is partially undermined by th e sa me kinds or problems Fraidin a nd Hanson att ribut e to th e conve ntiona l justification for locku ps: a bidder wouid not rece ive th e lockup Lintil afcer it had already incurred th e costs of deciding whe ther w m ake a
pa rtic ul a r bid. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
This is not surp rising given that th e conventiona l justification fo r lock ups and the auction
a rgument are closely re lated, as not ed be low. In a sense, th e con venti on al justification applies
wh en a target grants a lockup to th e initial bidder, and the auction a rgum ent often relates to
lockups given to second or subsequ ent bidders.
36 The limitations of these justifications do not undermine the gene ral cas e fo r aliowing lockups in some contexts, but th ey do have important implications for court treatment of locku ps, as
discussed in more detail in Part IV. One implication worth noting now is that, unlike previous
commentators' view of lockups, these new justifications purport to eve n validate lockups th at
wo uld give a bidder more than its "expectation" damages. To th e extent the new justificati ons
are probl ematic, these shortcomings therefore ra ise doubts about th e approp riateness of supraexpectancy lockups.
37 See, e.g. , Bainbrid ge , supra not e 8, at 251.
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do in fact deviate from those of target share holders,Js and assum e that
"loya l" m an agers will invariably grant "compe nsatory " lockups lockups that obtain f(-,r the target shareholders as m uch in benefits .,
such as a higher bid or better terms, as the shareholders relinquish in
potential dama ges should th e lockup be triggered .
This Part argues, con trary to Fraidin and Hanson's assumption ,
th::~t even " loyal" man agers may grant excessive lockups in many contexts. FirsT, hmvever, I should clarify what I mean by appropriate, as
ormos ed to ~;xc•~: s;ive or mali::znan t lockuvs, and defin e the terms I will
use for the ;·err:a! nd.er of the Article.
Comrne~1tat,_,rs frequent ly characterize appropriate lockups as
those ptt rSL'a nt to which the bidde r and target receive rov.gh ly
equivalent benetlls , and ma lignant lockups as those that aooear to
benefit the bidder at the expense of the target. I will adopt~· simila r
strategy in this Part, since the Part is concerned with the question
whether target managers will ever enter into bad lockups. I will refer
to such a lockup , one th at benefits a bidder at the expense of the target, as "ma lignant" or " excessive. " In subsequent Parts, I also will
occasionally refer to lockups as "supra- exp ectancy" lockups to describe a lockup that promises a bidder more than its anticipated profits from the acquisition. O ther commentators have assumed, as do I,
that supra-expectancy lockups are excessive because of the for eclosing
effect such lockups can have on higher valuing bidd ers.39 Thus, supraexpectancy lockups can be seen as a particular kind of excessive or
malignant lockup.
Although commentators often purport to consid er whether a
lockup gives equivalent benefits to the bidder and the target, as I will
clo in-this Part, \vhen it comes to their specific prop osals, commentators have usually focused on the amount of compensation the bidder
\Vill receive under the lockup. This focus on bidder compensation is
both uns urprising and justifi ed, given that lockups act very much like
a liquidated damages provision for the bidder. 40 The r eliance damages approach set forth in Part IV aiso focuses on bidder compensation, although it calls fo r a very different kind of inquiry. 4 1
l

~

,_.,

l

38 See, e.g, Fraidin & Hanson , supra not e 9, a t 1785-87.

39 See infra nore 84. Alt hough one can imagine supra-expectancy lock ups th at a re not m al ignant , several factors-the ch illing effect lockups have on other bids, the problems discussed in
thi s Part, and the fact that a su pra-ex pectancy lock up is not necessary to achi eve th e primary
benefits of a lock up - suggest th at supra-expectancy lock ups routin ely will be excessive .
40 Ian Ayres sugge sts that any amo unt greater than " full insurance" is inappropriately ge nero us, for instance, and defines ''full insurance" in terms of a bid der 's ex pectancy inte rest. Ayres,
supra no te 8, at 704 -07. Tha t is, he sugges ts that a lock up is appropri ate so long as it does not
provide to a bidder more than the profi ts it would have received had its deal with th e targe t gone
through-a standard simila r to the traditional expectation measure of contract damages.
41 ln add ition to focusing on the a mount of compen sa ti on a lockup gives the bidder, De laware co urt s some times purpo rt to consider what the target receives in exc hange. See, e.g. , Mills
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A.

Duty of Loyalty Concerns

The principal reason for courts' and commentators' longstanding
hostility to lockups is their fear that managers of a target face a severe
conflict of interest in the acquisition context. 42 Under this view, lockups may exacerbate managers' inclination to focus less on shareholders ' welfare than on protecting their own jobs when a target is being
so id. By granting an excessivel y generous lock up to the bidder that
ser::ms most sensitive to their concerns, the managers of a target can
ens ure that the favored bidder wins out, even if another bidder wouid
otherwise offer more. 4 3
Commentators have suggest ed various solutions to the confl ict of
interest problem, such as presumpt ively invalid ating any lockup that
affects more than ten percent of a target's assets unless it has first
been subject to the market test of an auction. 44 Delaware's most recent pronouncement is even stricter, suggesting an almost complete
distrust of target managers' motives in the lockup context. 45
Fraidin and Hanson contend that the widespread concerns about
managerial loyalty are misguided. Because managers fre quently own
substantial amounts of stock, they have a direct financial incentive to
sell a target to the highest bidder. 46 Moreover, even if managers were
thoroughly disloyal and interested only in job protection, they still
would seek out the highest bidder, since the highest bidder could
match any side deal offered by a lesser bidder. 47
Fraidin and Hanson are persuasive in arguing that overt disloyalty seems less pervasive than many commentators have assumed, and
that loyalty concerns do not justify a blanket judicial refusal to enforce
Acquisition v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988) (considering whether target received a
'·substantial benefit"). Because it is extreme ly difficult to isolate the benefits a target receives in
connection with a lockup, focusing on th e bidder's damages is a more useful and manageable
approach, as in other liquidated damages contexts.
42 The classic early statement, al thou gh it involved tak eover defenses rather than lockups ,
was the Delaware Supreme Court's suggestion in Unocal that the "omnipresent specter that a
boa rd ma y be acting primarily in its own interests" necessitated special scrutin y of directors'
actions in the takeover context. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A .2d 946 (Dei. 1985).
43 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183-84 (Del.
1986); Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 273-74.
44 Bainbridge, supra note 8, at 323-24; see also Johnson & Siegel, sup ra note 8 (calling for
shareholder vote with respect to significant lockups).
45 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 50-51 (Del. 1994).
The court in Paramount was so hostile to the lockup arrangement Paramount and Viacom had
agreed to in that case that parti es have subsequently shied away from stock lockups, though
bidde rs contin ue to negotiate for termination fees. See Greg Steinmetz, Stock-Option Lockups
are Absent from Takeover Deals, WALL ST. J., May 24, 1994, at Cl.
46 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1804-05.
47 !d. at 1785.
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lockups. 48 Consequently, overt disloyalty can and should be dealt
wi th separately, as proposed in the "reliance damages " m odel in Part
IV.
B ut to suggest that disloyalty never interferes vvith m anagerial
decisionmaking in this context seems seriously mistaken. Moreover ,
even nominally "loyal" managers may be prone to granting excessive
lockuos. The remainder of this Part considers several rea.sons •NhV ex'
.
cessiv e lockups are a very real concern. In connection ~~~; it h this discussion , I a lso no te some of the perverse conseq<Jcnses oi excessive
.toe,k_ups.

B.

Why "Loyal" Managers May Gram Excr::ssive Lo ckups

Fraidin and H anson suggest that there is no thin g ':o 'Nmry about
once we have taken overt disloyalty problems into account. They assume that so long as it is loyal, a board will never agree to an inap propriate lockup . According to Fraidin and H anson, their assumption
"can be justified on the ground that courts are in no position . .. [to]
second guess the decisions of loyal boards. " 49 Even if Fraidin and
H anson's dim view of judicial competence is justifi ed, an issue explored in detail in the following Part, the question whether and how
frequently "loyal" boards grant malignant lockups has critical im plications for their insistence that the benefits of lockups are not offset by
any conceivable harm.
The analysis below describes two contexts where even "loyal"
managers may grant excessive lockups. Together with the possi bility
of disloyai be havior by target managers, the analysis suggests substantial grounds for concern.

1. l'vfanagerial Afistakes in the Bargaining Pro cess. - An obvious,
and potentially widespread, source of excessive lockups is that a target's managers may simply make a mistake; that is, that the m anagers
may miscalculate the amount that a bidder has at stake or the value of
the lockup that the parties agree to. Managers can m ake m iscalculations in any context where they stipulate damages, of cours e, but the
risk that mistakes will lead to excessively generous d amages seems
particularly high with lockups.
First, stock lockups can be particularly difficult to value becartse
the parties may have little way of knowing what the upper value m ay
be (since this will be determined by the winning bid of a bidder who
48 Even if th e deal as a whole is tainted , a lockup provi sion may play a va luable ro le in
promoting bidding if it is limited to an appropriate amount. Con se quentl y, Del awa re 's tendency
to void lockups altogether in such contexts, based on a conclusion that th ey are pa rt of an " overa ll pattern" of inappropriate behavior, seems misguided. See, e.g., Rev/on , 506 A. 2d at 184. l
offer what I vi ew as a superior approach in Part IV.
49 Fraidin & Hanson , supra note 9, at 1745 n.l6.
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may not initi ally be known to either party). 50 In theory , the amount of
a higher bidder's fin al bid is related to the lockup bidder's reservation
price, since the 1vinning bid in an auction ordinarily should equat (or
barely excee d) the reservation price of the second highest bidder. B ut
it is unclear whether this in fact is true in practice in the corpor·ate
acquisition context. The nev,r bidder's presence may alter the lockup
bi dder's reservation price, fo r example, or the new bidder may offer
mere than this price if the auction is not an E nglish (that is, increas ing
' . _..l '
•
-·
o:u) auction.=>:
Hms , even u tne part1es iVlS h e d to corre 1at e ;ocKup
clarnages in some fasrt ion vvith the lockup bidder's reservation price,52
the higher bidder's final bid mz.y not be an appropriate surrog2te fo r
this amount , and the problem is com pounded by the fact that a loc kup
ordinarily cannot affect more than twenty percent of a targe t's stock .5 3
The second fac tor indirectly returns us to the question of m an age ria l loyalty. However loyal managers may otherwise be to target
sh are holders, they fr equently will have an implicit preference fo r one
bidder over another. Such preferences could play a role on the margin in any transaction a corporation enters into, but they take on particular significance in the acquisition context, since acquisitions affect
the very nature of the en terprise. In Revlon, for instance, it was no
secret that Michel Bergerac, Revlon 's chief executive, viewed suitor
Ronald Perelman with deep animosity. 54 Similarly, in the recent contest for Paramount, newspapers widely reported that Paramount's
Martin Davis enjoyed far more cordial relations v;ith Sumner Redstone of Viacom than he did with Barry Diller, the CEO of QVC,
Paramount's other suitor. 55
In short, managers of a target may be particularly subject to cognitive dissonance in the acquisition context, at least in some cases conJl.ating their own preference.s that the target be sold to o ne bidder
r~

' £

1

•

•

1

'

50 The Delawa re Supreme Court was particul arly conce rn ed abou t th is in Paranwum , sta ting
th a t " [b]ecause the Stock Option Agreement was not 'capped' to limit its max imum doll a r va lue,
it had the potential to reach (and in this case did reach) unreasonab le levels." Pa ram ount Communications, lnc. v. QVC Ne twork , Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del. 1994).
5 1 For a good overview of corporate auctions and the implicati ons of different auctio n strategi es, see Macey, supra note 35.
52 A n expectancy-based locku p, for instance, would give the bidde r an amoun t equal to the
diffe rence bet ween its bid and its reservation price; Fraidin an d Hanson's differing expectati ons
and risk aversion rationales both appea r to use ex pectancy as a floor.
53 lf th e ta rge t is listed on the New York Stock E xchange, for instance, the issuance of 20%
of its stock wo uld requi re a sh arehold.~ r vote, thus undennining much of th e purpose of the
lockup.
54 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAnd rews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del.
1986) (referring to Bergerac's "strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman ").
55 See, e.g., Susan Anti ll a, Hard L essons of Param ount's Saga, N.Y. TI!VIES, Dec. 26, 1993, at
Fll (noting that it is we ll- known that Martin Davis "hates Barry Diller") .
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rather tha n others with the best interests of their shareholders. 56
Managers may overestima te the attractiveness of oth er aspects of the
bidder 's offer c::· tlnderestimate t.he lil<elil1ood or nolentia1 val11e of a
comnetim~ offer. 57 Together, valuation difficulties ~nd the existen ce of
implicit preferences create a non trivial nossibilitv that lo'y· al ~na "'1 'loerc
t;)
.
will m ake cost ly mistakes in gran ting lockups.ss
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56 Such d issonance see ms most like ly to com e into play when the re is o niy one bid de r and
th e ta rge t 's managers discou nt the possi bili ty tha t o th ers will eme rge, o r-as very freq uent ly is
the case-when it is unci ear which o f two o r mo re bidde rs is th e hi ghest val uing bid de r. Ta rge t
managers canno t so ea sily j usti fy a preference if the prefer red bidder clea rl y is no t th e hi ghe st
valuing bidd e r.
57 1l1e fa m o us Globe Woo len case m ay we ll have been an e xamp le of such a dynamic. G lobe
Woolen Co. '! . U tica Gas & E lec. Co., 121 N. E. 378 (N. Y. 1918). In Globe Woolen , Mayna rd ,
who was a d irecto r of both G lo be Wo olen and U tica G as and E iectri city, an d the largest s tockholder o f Globe Woo len , agreed at the urging o f a Utica office r to conside r conv erting G lobe
Woolen 's mi lls to e lectricity . But Maynard m ade clear that he would only be in te rested if U tica
guaran te e d th at lhe switch would reduce G lobe Woolen 's energy costs. The contract th a t the
Utica em ployee dev ised and the parties ag reed to tu rn ed out to give Globe Woolen an enom1o us
wind fa!i , and was sin.:ck down by Judge Ca rdozo as viola ting l'VIayn a rc! 's duty o f lo ya lty to Ut ica.
Whi le no ev ide nce sugges ts tha t Jl/ fa ynard was invol ved in drafti ng the p r,; posed cont ract, o r that
the Utica employe e in t ?nt ionclly fa vo red G lobe Wool en, one suspe cts that th e em plo ye e 's su bconscio us desire to make th e arrangement work fo r Globe Woolen-due to Ma yna rd's stat us as
on e o f h is employe r's (U ti ca's) dire cto rs-increase d th e lik elih ood of a misca lculation such as
th e one tha t in fac t occur re d.
58 In th e a nalogous contex t of liquidated d ama ges, comme n tato rs have suggested tha t prom isees hav e a disincenti ve tc seek su pra-compensa tory d am ages beca use th ey will have to pay for
the extra compe nsatio n, pe rh aps in the form of a high er bid. A lan Schwa rtz, Th e i\dyth thm
Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory R em edies: A n Analysis of Co.vztracting fo r Contract Dam ages , 100 YA LE L.J . 369 (1990) . N otice that a bidder's gen eral d isinciination to pay for excessive
re lie f m igh t reduce, bu t wo ul d no t el iminate, the possibility o f mista ke. Moreo ve r, a n y such
di sinclination see ms li ke ly to be pani cul arly m ut ed in the co rporate acq uisition con text, espe cially if the ta rge t man age rs' prefe rences cau se them to attach little va iue to th e possibility of
o ther, hi ghe r bids .
59 T ne cl ass ic article is Phillipe A ghion & Patrick Bolton , Contraas as a Barrier to Erury, 77
AM. EcoN. REv. 388 (1987) . Aghion and Bo lton 's insights have recen tly beeT! a pplied to t he
contractu al li qui dated dam ages and antit rust contexts. Josep h F. Brod!ey & C hing-to A . Ma,
Conrracr Pena!iies, !'vlonopoiizing Strategic, and Amitrusl Po licy, 45 STA !--1 . L. REv. 1161 (1993);
Tai- Ye ong Chun g, On the Socia! O ptirnality of Liquidated Damages Claus es: A n Economic A n aly sis , 8 J. L. EcoN. & 0RG. 280 (1992).
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such a provision so that it will receive some of the rents obtain ed from
a third partv that attemots to enter the market. 60
Thus, in the corporate acq uisition context, a bi dder who has market power may demand a lockup that excludes all other bidders except
those that not only can outbid the iockup bidder in absolute terms, but
also can sh oulder the cost of the excessive damages triggered if they
win the bidding. It is not clear how fr equently bidders are likely to
have market power superior to that of a target. Yet many, and perhaps most , observers do not view the market for corporate control as
a competitive market ,61 and a bidd er may often have significant leve rage if the targe t's managers are concerne d th at another, more hostil e
bidder could emerge.
Fraidin and H ans on acknowledge that bidders and targets m ay
e nter into collusive lockups, but characterize this as a potential benefit
of lockups rat her than as a problem. A simple hypothetical illustrates
their reasoning. Assume that the initial bidder, Bl ,62 values the target
at $75; another bidder, B3, values it at $100; and the target's managers
would be willing to sell it for $70 or m ore. Rather than auction the
target, both the bidder and the target may benefit if they enter an
agreement pursuant to which Bl bids $85 and target agrees to a $14
lockup. 63 Absent the lockup, B3 would have won the auction by
agreeing to p<:y $75 for bidder. The lockup forces B3 to raise its bid to
$86 (or, more precisely, to an amount greater than $85), which together with the $1 4 B3 must pay to Bl equals B3's full reservation
price, and enables Bl and the target to secure most or all of B3's profits for themselves. 64
This account suggests that collusive damages not only may accord
with allocative efficiency (since the bidder that values the target most,
B3 , will win the bidding), but they may also be value increasing for
target 's shareholders. The problern with the account is that it seems to
•

l

60 T he collusion ana lysis depends on an assumption that a third-pa rty entrant is lik e ly to
have market power-that is, th at there will be on ly one en trant, rather than, competing ent rants.
See, e.g., Bradley & Ma, supra note 59 , at 1173. This very frequ ently is the case in the corporate
acquisition context, as suggested by the discussion of the nature of th e corpo rate co ntrol mark e t
below.
61 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock , Antitrust and the Markel for Co rporme Com rol, 77 CAL L.
REv. 1365, 1379 (1989). Fraid in and Hanson th emselves note this in another context. Fraidin &
Hanson, supra note 9, at 1813 n.284.
62 Following Fraidin and Hanson's notation (which they in tum borrow from Ayres, supra
note 8), I use Bl to indicate the initial bidder (and recipient of the lockup) and B3 to refer to th e
new, higher valuing bidder.
63 Notice that, while BZ's $85 bid exceeds its rese rva tion price , Bl does not expect to pay thi s
amount because it anticipates that B3 will win the bidding. Some of the problems with this
analysis are discussed below.
64 Thus, the target would receive a $16 profit ($86-$70), and Bl wo uld receive the $14 value
of its lockup. Absent the lockup, B3 would only ne ed to bid $75 (or slightly more) to win the
bidding, thus giving th e target a profit of $5 ($75-$70) and leavi ng Bl with nothing.
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assume that Bl and target have equal bargaining power and that both
know exactly what B3's reservation price fo r target is. The parties'
ability to ascertain B3's resen;ation pric.:; is limited if B3 has actively
participated in the bidding process, and next to none if the target and
Bl agree to a lockup before any other biddeL have entered the bidding. Moreover, if Bl has superior bargaining power, or if the parties
.
B..,,
.
'
'
'
.
. ld f
rmsgauge
, .J s va l uatwn
01r tne
target, trro;
1 C>c~cxp
may y1e_
ar more
-:r..c c
·
.
m-,,..,.
rnangnant consequences. 11, i.or ms1:an.ce,
mos J>; u a no 1s g1ven a
lockup worth $35, allocative efficiency could be i:hwartcd, since B3
may never enter the bidding, and target's shareholders could fare
worse than they '·Nould in a simple auction.55 S1_1c'n a re:mlt seems at
least as likely to occur as th~ rcsy sc~i1a rio Fraidin and Hanson
depict. 66
In sum, Fraidin and Hanson's assumption that loyal managers will
never grant excessive lockups is simply an assumption. The likelihood
of mistakes and collusion makes clear that malignant lockups are a
very real concern. The most obvious consequence of such lockups is
that they may cause a target to be sold to a lower valuing, rather than
the highest valuing, bidder. Given that lockups enhance target managers' ability to control whether a particular bidder acquires the target, excessive lockups also can have perverse effects outside of the
bidding process. 67 Because potential bidders fe ar that the target will
grant a lockup to a favored bidder, and thus thwart any unsolicited
offe r, lockups can reduce bidders' incentive to engage in a search.68 In
addition, target managers ' ability to use lockups as leverage in negotiating continued employment or attractive severance packages could
1 ·

- -------------------

1

•

,

1

•

•

________ _______________
,

65 8 1's bid of $70 gives ta ige t share hold ers :];5 less than th e $75 they wou ld receive in a

simple auction. The lock up thu s acts like a specific perfon:'1a nce provision. This presuma bly is
at le ast part of what Viacom had in mind wh en it ann oun ced, in a much- quot ed stat ement, that
onl y a " nuclear attack" co ul d prevent its acquisit ion of Paramount from going throu gh . Paramo un t Co mmunications, Inc. v. QVC Newtwork, inc., 637 A .2d 34, 39 (De l. 1994). Notice th at
an asset lockup is particularly likely to entail wh at, in effect, is specific pe rfonnance, although
the parties ru n the ri sk that a lockup involving the ta rge t's key assets will be seen as a sale of
most or all of its assets, th us requi1ing a sha reh olde r vote . See, e.g., DEL CoDE. ANN. tit. 8, § 271
(S upp. 1995).
Fraidin and Hanson's response to th is is to suggest th at Bl will resell the target to 83, which
would make bo th bette r off and assure that th e target ultimately winds up in the hands of the
highest va luing bidder, 83 . I describe some of the impediments to this scen a rio in Part III, infra.
66 The collusion problem is particul arly acu te if B l and th e ta rget do not kn ow whethe r BJt hat is , a high er valuing third party- exists at the tim e they agiee to an acquisiti on and locku p,
since uncerta in ty abo ut 83 magnifies the likeli hood that Bl can secure a lockup that p recludes
entry by anoth er bidder. See Brodley & Ma, supra note 59 .
67 The concerns discussed below can arise eve n with an oth erwise app ropii ate lockup. They
obvio usly are exacerba ted if th e target 's man agers grant an excessive lockup.
68 Marcel Kahan and Michael K lausner discuss this concern in detail in a forthcoming article.
See Ka han & Klausn er, supra note 10.
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diminish the ex ante disciplining effect the takeover m a r ket has on
managers. 69
Lockups also offer significant benefits, as \Ne ha ve se en. B ut the
perverse effects the y can have suggest that co urts have eve ry reason to
b e concerned that target managers not en te r into malignant lock up
arrangem en ts .

III.

TH E iM P OS S IBILIT Y OF F ORE CLOSI NG HI G H E R BID D E R S ?

\Vhile Fraidin and H anson might quib ble '.vi th the p a niculars of
the preceding analysis, they a ppe ar to ad:. nowledge the possibility of
excessive lockups. Th eir response is to sugges t th at there is nothing to
worry about, and that the concerns noted in the preceding analysis are
mistaken. In what argua bly is the pivotal conte ntion in their a rticle,
Fraidin and Hanson insist that even an excessive lockup will n ot for eclose a higher bidder from acquiring the target and , as a result , that it
does not make a difference whether a target 's managers some times
grant inappropriately generous damages.7°
Simply put, they argue that as long as Bl 's bid plus th e amount of
the lockup is less than BJ's reservation price, 83 will win the bidding
in the first instance; moreover, even if an excessive, supra-expectancy
lockup stymies B3 initially, thus enabling Bl to acquire the target, B3
will sim ply arrange to purchase the target from Bl at some price
higher than Bl 's reservation price but lower than B3's. Thus, even if
the lockup is great enough to thwart a higher valuing bidder initially,
it will not prevent such a bidder from ultimately acquiring the target.
In short , lockups will not interfere with all ocative effic iency.
Despite its surface appeal, the suggestion that lower va luing b idders will always resell targets to higher bidders, an d in d oing so
counteract the effects of excessive lockuos, ·p roves m oblem atic on inspection. ~Th e subparts that follow consider the two most o b vious imoediments to this scenario. 71
,

l

l

69 !d. Tl1e de trim ent al effe ct on manage ri al discipline sho uld no t be ove rsta ted . Even if th e
m an agers of a target a re able to retain their jo bs, th ey are likely to be subj ec t to enhance d
o vers ight after a takeove r. Mo reove r, beca use ta keo ve r defenses already give ta rget m a nage rs a
significant say in whethe r th e target is or is n o t tak en over, as we ll as signifi cant leverage in
ba rgaining with a bidde r, lockups m ay have onl y a m a rgin al additi onal effe ct.
70 Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1788-89 . As th e illustrati on belo w sugges ts, any lock up
that gives a bidd e r m ore than its e xpectancy inte rest can ha ve the fo recl osing effec t describe d in
this Part. For a mor e detailed discussion of this point and its implicati ons, se e infra no te 83.

71 In addition to th e problems with re sale as a means of counteracting excessive lockups th a t
I discuss be low, full enforcement of excessive locku ps m ay dimin is h th e parti es' ince ntive to
ren egotiate inappropria te lockup provision s. Thi s conce rn is discussed ir, great e r det a il in Pa rt
IV .
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The Costs of Resale
J

,

'

'

_La tr1e rnllcn -cltea aeoate aoo11t managers r e spon s:~ tc' ta.keO\'er
effo rts, Ronald Gilson suggested that resale by an initial bidder afte r it
acq< tired a target could entail substantial costs.7 2 G ilson's reasoning
was that once a bidder and target merge, any subsequent bidder (B3 )
now r:;ust valu e the combined entity. A. s a result, any previous inves\iga tion of the tmget is largely useless , and B3 rnust reinves tigate in
md er w 2,ccount for the effects of >.h e initial bidder-target combinati.on. /\_t its heart, G ilson's analysis was an arg ument about the likelihood of Coas ian bargaini ng in the corporate acquisition context. In
his vie w, significant transaction costs wou ld impede th e multiple trans·
acri:::ms necessary to move a target to the bi" der that values it most.
Fraidin and H anson point out in response that, by reselling the
target before it and the target have merged ("preselling" the target),
the initial bidder (Bl) can minimize the need for the duplicative investigation that Gilson was concerned about. Ye t even a pres ale of this
sort would fa ll far short of eliminating the costs of an additional sale.
M oreover, presales obviously would not take place on every occasion
when a higher valuing bidder (B3) existed, particularly if Bl were unaware of B3's existence. In short, resales and even presales would
entail significant costs that would potentially thwart th e second sale
on which Fraidin and Hanson's analysis depends in some, a nd perhaps
many, cases.
W hat are these costs? First, even if B3 already had e valuated and
bid on the target, and Bl and the target had not yet combined (thus
obviating G ilson 's "reinventing the wheel" concern), both it and Bl
still v.;ould face additional investigation and other costs in connection
'Nith the second sale. If B3 had dropped out of the original bidding

72 Rona ld J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Vers us Pure Passivity in Ten der Offe r Defense ,
35 STA>J . L R Ev. 51 , 63 (1982); see also Lucian A. Be bchuk , The Case for Facilitating Comp e1ing
Te nde r Offers, 95 HARV. L R Ev. 1028 (1994); Lucian A . Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Compering Tender Offers: A Reply and Exrension , 35 STAN. L REv. 23 (1982) [hereinafter, A
Reply and Extension] . The de bate grew out of E asterbro ok and Fisch el's " passivity" thesis that a
ta rget 's managers should never defend against tak eo ver effo rts, and ce ntered on Easterbrook
and Fischel 's exchanges with Gilson and Bebchuk . Frank H. E as terbrook & D ani e l R. Fischei ,
Th e Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding ro a Tender Offer , 94 HARV. L REv.
1161 (1981) ; see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, A ucrions and Sunk Cosrs in
Te nder Off ers, 35 STAN. L REv. 1 (1982). Alan Schwartz subsequently weighed in with Easterbrook and Fische l, and aga inst the auction regime fa vo red by G ilson and Bebchuk. A lan
Schwartz, Search Th eory and rhe Tender Offer A uction , 2 J.L EcoN. & 0RG. 229 (1986). The
question wh ether resale would ensure allocative efficiency if co urts enforced a ll lockups parallels
this debate in many respects, Fraidin & Hanson, supra no te 9, at 790-94 , though with some
in teresting differe nces. Unlike passivity, full enforcement could und e rmine, as we ll as enhance,
search, as disc usse d ea rli er.
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oKaer, iJ, J, c12·; agreea ,_ o p urc1 as e Large t !.or :o i t anei nas oeen
given a $35 loctup, and that B3 values target at $100. While B l has an
incentive to sell targ·e t to B3 for some amount between $75 an d $100,
and B3 has an incentive to buy, as in any negotiating process, uncer··
tainty about one another 's bargaining range or other factors may prevent them from reaching agreement.7 6 More than in many co ntex ts , in
corporate acquisitions, personality conflicts and target directors ' recognition that they may lose their positions as a result of the takeover
m agnify these frictions , and can play a large role in whether a deal
actually goes through .7 7 If an initial contest between Bl and B3 to
purchase target v;as acrimonious, such frictions might prevent resale
negotiations from ever getting off the ground.7 8
•

' c'

1 ,

l nl tla1

~

((' ~· n

73 Notice that, if th e lock up led to an early conclusion of th e initi al sale , an y costs saved as a
res ult of B3 's eariy exit wo uld need to be subt ract ed fr om the costs incurred in the second sa le in
o rde r to de term ine th e net costs of the e xtra sale.
7 4 See, e.g., Be bch uk , Faci!ira cing Cotnpeting Tender Offers , supra note 12 , at 1048; Be bc hul<,
A Reply and Extension, supra note 72, a t 41. T he risk th at a higher valuin g bidder exists but
wo uld neve r be loca ted is no t a trivial on e. A ltho ugh the initial bidd er theo re tica ll y has an
incen tive to se<: rch for such a bidder, as a p ractical matte r man y bidders a re pri marily in te rested
in acquic-ing the ta rget, as note d below. See infra no te 79 and accom pa n ying tex t. U n less an
obvio usl y highe r va luing bidder is readi ly at hand , the initi al bidder m ay no t se rio usl y lo o k fo r a
sale , at least in the neu te rm.
75 I use th e term "st rategic bargaining fricti ons" in an effort to make cl ea r that the concerns
add resse d in the te xt tha t foliows a re a specific type of "friction" o r transactio n cost.
76 The extensive lite rat ure on ove rcoming such fricti ons att ests to th ei r pe rvas iveness . See,
e. g., R oGER f iS HER & W ILLIA lvl URY, GEITING TO YEs : NEGOTIATfNG A GR EEME NT W rTHO UT
G IVING IN (1 981); Jen nifer G era rda B rown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales fo r Mediation, 80
VP. . L REv. 323, 333 (1994).
77 See supra notes 54-55 an d accompanying tex t fo r anecdotal examples.
78 While Fra id in and Hanson allude to such costs, th ey dismiss them in a footnot e , based on
their belief that "th·o t ransactions costs of resa le and pre-sale are no highe r th an those betwee n
the recipient bidd er and th e targe t boa rd. " Fraid in & Hanson , supra note 9, a t 1303 n.239. Bu t
this does n ot fo llow from the ir analysis. The comparison is not between th e strategic ba rgaining
fr ictions of a targe t-Bl sa.! e and thos e of the sale by Bl to B3. R ath er than substituting on e sale
for the othe r, resale adds a seco nd sale. R esa le the refo re entails two sets of bargain ing frictions
rathe r than just one . M o re over, even if Fraid in and Hanson we re co rrect to compa re the two
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A consideration of the reasons the managers of bidders engage in
takeovers underscores the obstacles to resale. Observers h ave lo ng
suggeste d , and recent studies confirm, that hu bris is often :::m !rri. pcrtant motivating factor in a bidder's decision to engage in acqu isitio n
activity.7 9 Even in t he absence of an " empire building" m otiVi:-1 l:i(iTL,
bid ders who hav e strategic reasons for acquiring a targe t often h::rve
not pursued the acq uisition with resale in mind. I n both insta:n:.::es, 2.
successful initia l bidder may have little interest in considerin,g a. r·ss:=t!·'::
to B3. Moreove r, the literature on the gaps betvveen offer anc :::,=;}:i:ng
prices suggests that the price at which Bl would consider a r esa ii;:: rn 2.y
rise considerably once it has acq uired the target.80
Tax effects are still another source of potential impedirn.em::;. ln
.
. e, _j.J
R" cou1ld structure ns
. acqms1t1on
. . . orc tne
'
an auction
re:nm
t:.:. rg e: t ;:c:S a
81
tax-free reorgan ization in many cases. By contrast, the resale m e chanism could und ermine B3's ability to structure the acquisition a.s taxfree. If the in itial sale of the target to Bl were taxable, for in stanc,o;,
this sale might preclude B3 from characterizing its subse quent
purchase of the target from Bl as tax-free, thus adding a poten tially
huge transaction cost-an expense that could scotch t he dea l from
B3's perspective and, as a res ult, prevent the highest bidder fron1 acquiring the target. 82
~

-~

se ts of costs, th e second (81-83) sale might often involve more significant st rategic bargaining
friction s than a sale of target to Bl o r an auction involving Bl and B3. Not only do es target
managers' willingness to grant a lockup to Bl suggest that target-Bl strategic bargaining frict ions
may be comparatively low, but Bl and 83 will often be competitors, thus m agnifying the like lihood of such fr ictions. If such frictions are absent, on the other hand, and the res ale process
between 81 and B3 is too smooth (and even if it is not), it might even raise a ntit rust co nce rns.
Fo r an arg um ent th a t bidders who decide to negotiate jointly should be subject to antit rust scmtiny, see Rock , supra note 61.
79 See, e.g. , Ma th e w LA. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining Premiums Paid fo r
La rge Acquisitions: E vidence of CEO Hubris (July 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Northwesrern Univ ersity Law Review ) (four key characteristics of manage rs most like ly to
engage in short-term acq uisiti on activity we re in experience in the industry, good performance in
recent months, self-esteem, and recent, glowing press coverage); see also Richard R oll , Th e
Hubris Hyporhesis of Corporare Tak eovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986)
80 The offer/asking price gap refers to th e tenden cy of current owners of property to piace a
high er value on the property than do po tential buyers. The existence of such a gap is an impo rtant im pedim ent to Coasian bargaining. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 12.
81 A bidder genera lly can trear an acquisition as tax-free if a significant portion of !he
purchase price consists of th e bidder's stock. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 368(a) (1988) (defining
"reorganizati on "); id. §§ 354 -68 (providing for tax-free treatm ent of reorganizations whe re th ere
is a continuity of interest of the new and old security holders).
82 1l1e probl em is that the initial taxable purchase could be seen as e liminating the cont inuity
of inte rest between 83 and th e hold ers of the target's stock . In th e recen t, widel y fo llowed
decision in J.E. Seagram Corp. v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 75 (1995), which involved the com peting
tender offers by Seagram and DuPont for Conoco, th e Tax Court held that Seagram 's purchase
of a su bstanti al minority of Conoco's sha res through its unsuccessful tender offer did not des troy
the tax -free nature of DuPont's successful cash-and-stock tender. Had Seagram actuaiiy acquired Conoco, then sold its shares to DuPont in a sale-resale transaction, DuPont would have
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ship of a target.
B.

Process Concerns with a Full Enforcement Regime

In addition to serving as liquidated damages, lockup provisions
can (as noted earlier) act very much like a specific performance provision. Once the managers of a target grant an excessive lockup to an
initial bidder, they may effectively preclude the target fr om selling itself to any other bidder. Notice that resale or presale by the initial
. bidder to a higher valuing bidder does not change this. vVhile a second sale may transfer the target to a higher valuing bidder, the target
has already been sold to the initial bidder vvhen this occurs.
E ven if one is not concerned about lockups that are both excessive and foreclosing from the perspective of allocative efficiency, these
lockups are deeply problematic from a corporate decision-making
perspective. 84 In the corporate acquisition context, the role of a tarhad much more difficulty characterizing its acquisition as tax-free . Moreover, the Tax Court
made clear that any evidence that the two bidders were acting in concert (as would often be
present in the presale context in particular) would be-: likely to desuoy the requisite continuity of
interest where the initial transaction is taxable. The mere possibility of a dispute about the tax
treatment of a sale-resale transaction would be a significant deterrent to its consummation. My
thanks to Alice Abreu for her insights into these tax issues.
83 See Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1804 ("foreclosure is unlikely ever to occur").
84 Any lockup that assures a bidder more than its expectancy interest can foreclose higher
bidders, as Ayres (speaking in terms of "full insurance") pointed out. Ayres, supra note 8.
Although Fraidin and Hanson argue that thee parties might appropriately enter into supra-expectancy lockups in some circumstances, the need for such relief is questionable, as discussed earlier
in subpart i.B (differing expectations and risk a.version), and elaborated on below in arguing for
a reliance-based standard. See Part IV. Supra-expectancy lockups therefore seem much more
likely to reflect mistake or collusion than more benign origins, and I will assume that this is the
case in the discussion that follows. fvioreover, the process problems l describe raise questions
even about an otherwise benign, supra-expectancy lockup.
One further point warrants mention . Even an expectancy-based lockup may foreclose other
bidders and thus might also seem to raise process concerns in some contexts. The only bidders
that such a lockup would al ways foreclose are !ower vaiuing bidders, ho we ver, and in conse-
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get's managers IS to propose a merger or other transaction to target
shareholders ,85 and to put the final decision to a shareholder vote.s6
The problem with a foreclosing, supra- expectancy lockup is that it
makes the target's directors , rather than its shareholders, the final
decisionmaker as to the sale to the initial bidder. Once the sale has
been "locked up" with such a lockup, it is effectively a done deal, long
before shareholders have the onportunitv to resoond.
Fraidin and H anso n do not addre ss this concern, but re lated
que stions have surfaced in several im port ant non-D elaware decisions
that purport to apply Dela-..vare law. 87 The most prominent of these
cases have focused on agreements by a target board not to entertain
any bids other than that of th e in iti al bidder--so-called "exclusivitv"
provisions. Co urts generally have been hostile to these provisions.
Whil e the Ninth Circuit indicated a ·willingness to enforce an exclusivity provision/' 8 two state supreme courts have refused to hold directors to "best efforts" clauses after changed circumstances m ade the
merger in question less attractive. 89
These exclusivity provisions arguably do not really interfere with
intracorporate decisionmaking, at least in the absence of duty of loyalty problems. This is because , from an ex ante perspective , directors
may be acting wholly consistently with their fi duciary duties when
they agree to a best efforts provision-only when circumstances
change does 20/20 hindsight cast doubt on the decision. Similarly, the
provisions affect, but arguably do not seriously undermine, sharehoider voting: shareholders can reject the proposal if a new suitor
emerges, and thus pave the way for a subsequent tender offer or
merger proposal from the new suitor. 90
_L
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-
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qu ence, this seems less problematic. Any resid ual concern would almost completely disappear
un de r th e reliance model proposed in the next Part.
85 See, e.g., D EL CoDE A I'.'N. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp. 1995) (req uiring directo r resoluti on as prereq ui site to merger) .
86 !d.
87 See Jewel Co. , Inc. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Nort hwest, Inc., 741 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1984);
Great Western Producers Coop. v. Great Western United Co rp., 613 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980);
ConAgra , Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576 (Neb. 1986) . A lthough the exten t to which these
cases actu ally reflect Delaware law is debatable, the Delaware Suprem e Co urt quoted Con Agra
with approval in Paramount. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Q VC N etwork, Inc., 637 A.2d
34. 51 (Del. 1994).
88 Jewel Co .. 741 F.2d 1555.
89 Grear Western Producers , 613 P.2d 873; ConAgra , 382 N.W.2d 576. Moreove r, commenta tors quickl y criticized the Ninth Circuit's decision in Jewel Co. , 741 F.2d 1555. See, e.g., Richard
M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CAL L. REv. 1671,
1698-1709 (1985) . As the anal ysis below sugges ts, my own view is that such provisions are defensible, at least absen t other problems.
90 While affirmative promotion of a m erger th e boa rd knows to be infe rior seems problematic from a fiduciary duty perspective, a boa rd's promise not to acti ve ly seek ad dition al offers
and to at least put th e existin g offer to a shareho lder vo te arguably should be enforced. Sharehold ers still may fear that their m anagers will fa il to negotiate with a new bidd er after the initial
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The same cannot be said of a supra-expectancy lockup, however.
Far more th::m exclusivity provisions, such a lockup m ay effec tively
foreclose ali other options .91 In theory, shareholders still can vote
clown the initial proposal, but any new suitor would be forced to make
good on ch e stock lockup, an added expense that may eliminate its
ability to top tl:.te initial bidder's bid. Thus, if a targe t's board grants a
supra-expect2ncy lockup, it m ay leave target sharehol ders with little
choice but to forego any takeover premium or to approve the initial
proposal.
/\t the least, this suggests that lawmakers should sharply curtail
the allmv able duration of such locku ps. If the lockup wer e strictly
hrni j~e d in ·uration, shareholders' ability to rej ect th e exis ting proposal in the hope of a subsequ ent, better offer would not be nearly as
s::rimisl'11 undermined. From the initial bidder's oersoective, of course,
this would take away much of an otherwise foreclosing lockup's attractiveness. Nevertheless, it seems clear that some degree of judicial
scrutiny of lockups is both necessary and inevitable, contrary to Fraidin and Hanson's call for universal enforcemen t.
.

IV .

'

1

ALT ERN A T IVE APPROACHES TO CORPO R ATE LOCKUPS

In assessing the existing literature on lockups, Fraidin and Hanson contend that a lockup should never be invalidated unless it both is
excessive and forecloses other possible bidders. In their view, no
lockup will meet this standard of malignancy. The authors therefore
conclude, paraphrasing Delaware's Chancellor A llen, that since "lockups, like chicken soup, can't hurt but may well help ," 92 courts should
always enforce them.
Th.e problem with their otherwise well- reasoned analysis is that
Iod.ups d early can "hurt. " As we have seen, even loyal boards will
sometimes grant excess ive lockups, and such lockups may thwart sales
to higher valuing bidders. Because full enforcement falls far short of
The perfectio n that Fraidin and Hanson attribute to it, we mus t compare it to other plausible approaches. I take up this task in the subparts that follow and, in doing so, propose a reliance damages
approach to judicial scrutiny of lockups.
proposal has bee n voted down. But fiduciary duty constraints, toge th er with th e ne w bidde r's
ability to make a tender offe r directly to the shareholders, reduce the ex tent of this problem.
91 See Buxba um, sup ra no te 89, at 1706. For a similar point a bout fiduci a ry duti es in the
t:oke over context, see Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: Th e Delaware S upreme Court's
Tak eover Jurisprudence, 19 l CoRP. L. 583, 596-97 (1994) . Ka han a rgues that the ina bility of
Rev lon 's sho.reholders to reverse th e merge r agreement between Fo rstm ann and Revlon if th ey
wished to do so , due to defensive meas ures such as th e lockup used in th a t case, was an importan t facto r in the Delawa re 's Supre me Court 's decision to app ly enhanced scrutiny in R evlon,
Inc. v. MacA ndrews & Forbes H oldings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (DeL 1986).
92 Fraid in & Hanson , supra note 9, at 1745.
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A.

Inva lidating All Lockups

Given the shortcomings of a blanket enforcement regime, one alternative would be to move in precisely the opp osite direction --to
invalidate all lockup arrangements.93 Like full enforcement, universal
invalidation would obviate the need for judicial assessment of which
lockups are and are not appropriate. This approach also would elirninate the risk of malignant lockups and other problems .
The obvious downside to inva lidation is that it sacrifices all of the
~:; encfits of lockups-their usefulness in compensating a bidder fo r its
costs, fo r instance, and for en ti cing a reluctant bidder to oanicioate in
an auction. In light of these benefits, blanket invalidation seems rel atively unattractive unl ess v;e conclude that lockup arrangements are
routinely malignant Nevert heless, this clearly is a plausible approach.
It also avoids the kinds of process problems posed by a full enforc ement regime.
~

B.

'

1

A Reliance Damages Model of Judicial Scrutiny

The more obvious choice is a model between the extremes of invalidating all locku ps and Fraidin and Hanson 's full enforcement regime. This subpart describes a model for court differentiation and
argues that, while it too has shortcomings, the model is at le ast as
attractive normatively and is far more plausible positively than blanket enforcement. While previous commentators also have called for
varying kinds of judicial scrutiny, 94 this model, my reliance damages
model, differs in several crucial respects. Most importantly, based on
the analogy between lockup provisions and contract damages generally, I question the freq uen t use of expectancy-based assumptions
ab out lockups, after firs t making a case that courts should scrutinize
lockups at least to the exten t of striking down those that promise a
bidder more than its exp ectancy interest.

1. Lockups as Liquidated Damages Provisions. - 1n American
contracts law, judicial scrutiny rather than univers al enfo rcement of
liquidated damages provisions has long been the norm . In assessing a
provision that stipulates damages, courts consider whether it appropri93 Des pite the hosti lity tow a rds lock ups shown by the D ela ware Supreme Cou rt in Paramoum, the cou rt has always insisted th at locku ps are n ot per se inva lid . Paramount Communi ca-

tions, Inc. v. QVC Ne two rk , Inc., 63 7 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994) ; Rev/on, 506 A.2d a t 183.
De laware has, in fact, upheld substan tial lockups, alth ough usually afte r an auct ion or in cases
whe re no competing bid der has em erged. See, e.g. , Fraidin & H anson , sup ra note 9, at 1765- 66;
see also Yanow v. Scie ntific Leas ing, In c., No. C IY.A. 9536, CIV.A . 956 1, 1988 WL 8772 (D el.
Ch. Feb. 8, 1988) (16.6 % plus bidding expenses ); Hecco Ventures v. Sea-Land Corp., No. CIY. A.
8486, 1936 WL 5840 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1986) (21.7% of value of the targe t) . U niversal in va lid ation wou ld therefore mean a substanti al change in existing law.
94 See supra no te 8.
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ately compensates a nonbreaching party for her expectation damage:3,
striking down the provision if it operates as a penalty- i.e., if it gives
t he nonbreaching pany a greater profi t than she vvould have rece[\·e,j
if the contract had been performed. 95 Courts do not requir e that a
liquidated dam ages provision correlate perfectly with actual expectation damages. Instead , they tend to fo cus on whether the p ro vis io r~
;,vas a reasonable prediction of a promisee's likely dam ages in the
event of 2 b reach , an d whether the actual amount of dama ges V! <::s
uncerta inY6
A lth ough some contracts commentators have insisted that c ou rt~:
shoul d routine ly enforce all liquidated damages clauses,97 much as
Fraidin an d H anson arg ue for blanket enforcement of lockups, cou:;-t; '
hostili ty to supra-expecta ncy dam ages provisions can be persu asively
justified on efficiency grounds. By invalidating supra-expectancy liquidated damages provisions, courts can minimize the incentive promisees o therwise would have to strategically induce a breach to tak e
advantage of an excessive damages provision. 98 A n excessive damages provision may also be eviden ce of mistake or implicit collusion
between the parties. 99 G iven that lockups are closely analogous to
liquidated dam ages provisions, this reasoning also serves as a pmverful argument for judicial scru tiny of lockup arrangements.100
·~

95 See, e.g. , Samu e l A . R ea , J r. , Effi ciency Im plications of Penalties and Liquida:ed Damages,
13 J. LEGAL STUD . 147, 147-48 (1984). Othe r important articl es in th e lite ra tu re on liquida te d
dam ages incl ud e Kenne th W. Cla rkson et al. , Liquidated Dam ages v. Penalties: Sense or ,Von·
sense?, 1978 Wis. L. R Ev . 351; C ha rl es J. Goetz & R o be rt E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties an d the Jusr Comp ensation Principle: Som e Notes on an Enfo rcem ent i'v!o del an d a The ory of
Effici ent Breach , 77 Co w:vr. L. REv. 554 (1977) ; Schwa rtz, supra note 58; Eric L. Ta ll e y, 1-.lote ,
Comract Renego riarion, Mech anism Design, and 1he Liquidmed Damages Rule, 46 STAK L. Fi.E v .
11 95 (1994) [h e reinafte r Note, Contract Renegotiation].
96 R e a, sup ra no te 95, a t 147-48. The U ni fo rm Comm e rcia l Code and th e Seco n d Rest a tem ent ado pt esse n tiall y this sta nd a rd. U .C. C. § 2-71 8(1) ; R ESTATEMENT (SECO'<D) OF C ONTRACTS § 356 ( 1981). Howeve r, neith e r expressly li mi ts a co urt's focus to t he rime of the
co ntract, and some co urts have re quired th a t liquid ated dam ages be reasonable no t onl y th e ;;
but also at th e time of th e breach. See, e.g., Vines v. O rchard Hills, Inc., 435 A .2d 1022 (Conn .
1980) (focusi ng on reason abl eness at breach ). A t leas t one commentato r detects an incre asin g
te nd ency by co urts to inva lida te liquid a ted da mages provisions that are unreason a ble at the tim e
of breach, even if they we re reasonable initiall y. Note, Conrract Renegoriation, sup ra n ote 95 , at
1202-03.
97 Schwartz, supra note 58.
98 See Clark son et al., supra note 95, at 366.
99 See R ea , supra no te 95 , at 160- 63. R ea points out that nonenforcement in th e event of a
m istake "fo rces the party bes t able to acqui re info rm ati on on losses, the buyer, to acqu ire m o re
in form ation. " !d. at 162.
100 Eric Talley has rece ntly suggested , as an add itiona l reason fo r judicial scrutin y of excessive
liq uid ated d am age s provisions, th at scrutin y may red uce th e costs of ex post renegotiation of
inapp ro priate provisi ons, even if uncert ainty undermin es the courts' ability to accu ra tely de te rm in e th e no n breachin g party's actu al damages. Note, Coruract Renegotiation, supra n ote 95 , a t
1240- 41. For further disc ussion of this insight and its app licabili ty to corporat e lock ups, se e infm
no tes 106 & 127 and accompanying text.
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To be sure , not all of the justifications for striking down supraexpectancy liquidated damages provisions translate into the corpora te
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dfer.
The lockup agF::eme nt Paramoun t gave to Viacom, and which
\Vas eventually struck do;,vn by the Delaware Supreme C ourt, illustra tes this point. Pd l four of the events that would trigger Viacom 's
lockup rights turned on Paramount 's en tering into a Business Combination or Com peeing 'I:ans2.ction (as defin ed in the merger agreement) with another bidder. 10 2 Because each of these factors is in the
target's (here, P aramou nt's) control , a lockup bidder such as Viacom
could not easily induce breach. Moreover, "breach" is less pernicious
with lockups since it ordinarily benefits bo th parties-the lockup bidder receives the value of the lockup and the target sells to a higher
valuing bidder-rather than only the promisee (bidder); and the possibility that a higher bidder will emerge arguably is contemplated by
the parties and courts. 10 3
Despite such distinctions, the case for scrutinizing lockups is at
least as compelling as it is for other liquidated damages provisions. As
we have seen, and as happens with liquidated damages provisions ,
mistake, collusion, or other problems may cause the parties to agree
to an excessive lockup. W hile Fraidin and Hanson contend that there
is no reason to ·worry about even those lockups that foreclos e other,
higher valuing bidde rs, since a lockup bidder can simply resell to a
higher valuing bidder and thus ensure allocative efficiency, judicial
scrutiny offers several advantages over their sale-resale scenario.
101 See, e.g., Cla rk son et a!. , supra not e 95, at 366; see also Lake River Co rp. v. Ca rbor undum
Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985) (d icta not ing the inducement concern).
102 See Stock Option A greement Between Viacom , Inc, and Paramount Com mun ications, Inc,
§ 1.02(b) (Sept. 12, 1993) (d efi ning ·'exercise even t" as a ny of the events described in§ 8.05(b) of
the merge r agreement) (on file with the Norihweslern University Law R eview); A m ende d and
Resta ted Agre ement and Plan of Me rge r Between Viacom, Inc. and Paramount Communications, Inc § 8.05(b)(i)-(iv) (O ctobe r 24, 1993) (on fil e with the Northwestern University Law
Review).
103 Moreover, "breach" of a m erge r agreement ent ered into by a bidder and th e target's
board in one sense is no t re all y a breach (of the agreement as a whole, at least; it is a breach of
th e lockup arrangement), si nc e the merger agreement does not become fully en fo rceable until
the target's sha reholde rs approve it. No tice, however, that preliminary sta tus does not always
preclude a conclusion that jilting a would-be contract partner co nsti tutes breach. For a dramatic
recent example, see Te xaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App, 1987), cerr. denied,
485 us 994 (1 988).
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First, court scrutiny avoids the need for two separate sales. If th e
costs of a second sale are greater than those of judicial scrutiny, this
alone would justify limiting the scope of permissible lockup damages ,
an iss ue explored in more detail below. 104 Moreover, the prospect of
court scrutiny may both reduce the likelihood of mistake or collusion
in the first instance 105 and increase th e parties' incentive to renegotiate those lockups that neverth eless do turn out to be excessive .J06
Second, Fraidin and H an son 's resale contem plates the lockup
bidder making the ultima te sale of the target , whereas the target '-s
managers would ordinarily sell it to the higher valuing bidder after
court scrutiny of a lockup. Because th e target's managers are likely to
have more information about the target and its existing prospects than
the lockup bidd er, and at least as much in forma ti on about o ther potent ial buyers, the target will often be the better seller. In theory, a
full enforcement regime might offer th e best of both worlds, since the
parties could provide for a supra-expectancy, foreclosing lockup if the
bidder is the better seller, but forego such a lockup if the target a ppears to have a comparative advantage. Yet the possibility of disloyalty, mistake, or collusion suggests that this often will not be the re al
reason for the parties' agreement to a foreclosing lockup, 107 and as
noted earlier, lockup bidders often have little interest in reselling to
another bidder.los
Finally-and from a descriptive perspective, crucially-limiting
lockup damages avoids the corporate law process problems that undermine Fraidin and Hanson 's universal enforcement proposal. As
n oted above, invalidating supra-expectancy lockups addresses both
the foreclosure problem and the risk that target shareholders will be
forced to accede to an inferior acquisition offer. 109
Before we consider the principal concerns about judicial scrutiny,
it is useful to mention two additional insights that the case law an d
literature on liquidated damages suggest for a judicial scrutiny regime.
104 Notice that, whe reas we considered in subpart liLA th e possibility th a t the second sale
might never take place, the question here is whether, eve n if a resal e would occur, judicial scruti ny might be a less costl y means of achi eving the same result.
105 See, e.g., Rea, supra note 95 , at 162 (nonenforcement of excessive li q uidated dam ages
provision gives bu ye r incentive to acquire more information ).
106 See, e.g., Note, Conrracl Renegocialion, supra note 95.
107 Moreove r, the initial bidder still can locate an d resell to a higher valuing bidder if the
target fails to do so after court scrutiny, whereas the ta rget loses its incentive to loo k for better
bidders if it has granted a lockup th a t e ffecti vely excludes such bidders.
lO S See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
109 See subpart III.B. The adverse effect that enfo rcem ent of a supra-expectancy lockup
would have on the shareholders' ri ght to make th e fina l decision on an acquisition offe r could
make the comparison between full enforcement and judicial scrutiny moot as a practical matter.
Because judicial scrutiny of some sort is inevitable , th e rea l question may be what forrn it sho uld
take. Nevertheless, the compa rison between full enforcement and judicial scrutiny is useful because it serves to illuminate the adv antages of the reliance damag es approach set forth below.
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O ne concerns the issue of ex ante, as opposed to ex post reasonableness. As noted above, a court will sometimes uphold a liquidated
damages provision that is reasonable as of the time of the contract,
even if changed circumstances make it inaccurate by the time the
promis or breaches. 11 0 Shifting to th e lockup context raises the question of whether the emergence of a new higher valuing bidder, vvhose
bid dramatically increases th e value of a locku p. hould be treated
an alogously, as a cha nged circumstance that cloes not affect enforcement of the lock up. 111 M uch of the contracts l ite r a ~ur e suggests it
should be. 112 The reli ance damages approach described below would
frequently lead to a different conclusion, however. Th is is in pan because a reliance approach would focus initially on the lockup bidder's
other opportunities at the time of the agreement, rather than simply
on the emergence of a new bidder. 113
The analogy to liquidated damages also raises questions about
wha t courts should do when they conclude that a lockup is excessive.
In the liquidated damages context, invalidation is not a complete loss
for the promisee. Although she loses the windfall of an excessive
da m ages provision, the promisee ordinarily can still recover any
proven actual damages.l 14 Courts that strike dovvn a lockup arrangement, by contrast, ordinarily deny any recovery to the bidder in
question. 115
Why deny any recovery? Courts typically have refused recovery
based on the conclusion that excessive lockups are part of an overall
tainted process and must therefore be voided altogether.l 16 The
problem with this reasoning is that lockups may play a valuable role in
an auction even if the target's managers have otherwise acted improp11 0

111

See supra note 96 and accompa nying tex t.
T he Paramounr court was pa rti cularly troubled by th e ex post effects of the Para mount-

Viaco m stock lockup, as evid enced by its statement that "[b] ecause the Stock Option Agreement
was n ot 'capped' to limit its maximum dollar value, it had th e potential to reach (and in this case
did reach) unreasonable levels. " Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Ne twork. In c. , 637
A.2d 34, 39 (De l. 1994).
112 O n one vie w, th e e me rge nce of a new bidder does not constitute a changed circumstance
at all. The initial bidd e r's expectancy interest can be seen as including th e possibility of resale to
an o th e r bidder. which sugges ts th a t th e lock up co ntinu es to be reasonable ex post, despite the
sudd en increase in va lue. See, e.g., Polinsk y, supra note 23, a t 434 ( relevance to expectancy
inte rest of non breachin g party's abi lity to sell to a third party). As described below, my re li ance
approach leads to a very different focus.
113
11 4

See section III.C.
See, e.g., Lake Riv er Corp. v. Carb orundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 , 1290-92 (7th Cir. 1985)(in-

va li da tin g liquidated dama ges (by classifying th em as a penalt y) and remanding for dete rmination of act ual damages) .
115 See Revlon , Inc. v. MacAndrews & Fo rbes Hol dings, Inc., 506 A. 2d 173, 183-85 (Del.
1986) (voiding lockup an d cancellation fee).
1 16

See, e.g., id. at 184.
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erly.117 In addition , courts ' ali-or-nothing approach substantially diminishes the value of a lockup to the parties, since a bidder can never
be entirely sure that it will receive any protection at all.
To better ap preciate this point, consider the analogy between
lockups and fr audulent conveyance law. Fraudulent conveyance statutes strike down a ny tr ansaction by an insolvent debtor that does not
give the debtor " reasona bly equivalent value" in return. us l h e per se
nature of these provisions suggests an assumotion th at disprooo rtionace exchanges by insolvent de btors invariably reflect co llusion b ec. ""'
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d ebtor 's creditors. Courts t hat void a locku p altogether a ppear to do
so based on similar assumptions . Yet, questionable lockups differ
frorn classic fraudulent conveyances in several important r espects.
First, it often is quite unclear whether target managers ' granting of a
malignant lockup does in fac t reflect collusion with the recipien t bidder. Second, unlike fraudulent conveyances, which represent an unmitigate d loss for creditors, questionable lockups often may benefit
target shareholders-as suggested above-by causing a bidder to
raise its bid, for instance. B oth of these distinctions reinforce the conciusion that red ucing problematic lockups makes far more sense than
voiding them altogether.
¥/hat this suggests is that courts should separate the duty of loyalty issue from the damages question-on this issue Fraidin and Hanson seem very much on target in arguing that lockups should be
completely voided only if side payments or other overt duty of loyalty
violations are involved-- and courts should more closely track ordinary contract law with respect to damages. I will return to this issue
below, but for nmv the im portant point is that a strong case can be
m ade fo r a regime in which courts scrutinize lockups, much as they
scrutinize stipulated damages in other contract settings.
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2. Judicial Competence and the Cost of Court Scrwiny. -As wi th
Fraidin and Hanson 's universal enforcement model, judicial scru tiny is
not a perfect approach to lockup arrangements. To begin, judicial
scrutiny entails costs, such as attorneys' fees and the costs of engaging
other professionals in connection with litigation about the propri ety of
a lockup. Yet, direct costs of this sort are not likely to be overwhelm-

1 17 As Fraidin and Hanson suggest in a somewhat different context, Rev/on appears to be a
classic case in point. However problematic Revlon's treatment of its two bidders may have been,
granting a lockup to Forstmann Little & Co. induced Forstmann to increase its bid by a full
dollar per share after several previous rounds of bidding. Rev/on, 506 A. 2d at 178-79; Fraidin &
Hanson , supra note 9, at 1754.
llS See, e.g. , UNIF. F RAUD ULENT TRANS FER Acr § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. (1985).
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ing, and may well be less than the direct costs of the mu.ltiple sales
required in a full enforcement regime_119
',-1'
'T "'
d
·'
"· '
•
1..~ra1u m ana .rJ. anson o not compare me costs m w e two reg1mes,
due to their view that courts vvould be so ineffective in distinguishing
appro priate lockups from excessive ones as to ;;;liminate any virtues
that a judicial scrminy regime might otherwise have. 1-'o. court ;,vou ld
ne.eo to a etel-rrnrlf: a OIClcJer s reservation pr1ce u.nder .8JJ e xpe ct ai1 C~t ~·
based. scrtttirl v of .lockuos for i11stance, sir1ce tb.e Oi(iit-:r S ex1Jectatio n.
ir1terest e a tta ls che diffetei1Ce between its reservatio_n. ·orice and the
'
'
amou nt it ac tuaLly bids. Yet, courts are particularly ill-s ui ted to select
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Ir1 {Jth er co.n.texts, D el a v;,rare cc,urts a ·~l oi cl t h :::~ I1e ·~~d to IIlak.e su·bstantive det ermin ations of this sort by focusing on process issues such
as o.,vhether the parties have engaged in vigorous, a.rrns-length bargaining over terms. i 22 Yet even malignant lockups are likely to be preceded by ha rd bargaining, given that the interests of the target's
directors and the lock up bid der will often diverge not only fro m those
of the target's shareholders, but also from those of one another. 123 As
a result, the courts necessarily must make a substantive ass essment as
to wheth er the value of the lockup is excessive.
Fraidin and H anson clearly are correct about the difficulty of judicially making such valuations, 124 but this does not mean that such an
assessment cannot be made. Investment ban kers r outinely issue public predictions as to the likely outcomes- and expected purchase
price-of corporate acquisitions. In a well-publicized control contest,
119 No tice tha t some of th ese litigation costs also would be incurred in a full enforcement
regime;, since !oc:k up issues usua lly are lirigat ed as part of a general at tad: on t arget directo rs'
e xercise o f th e ir fiduci ary duties. While fuil enfo rcement of lockups mi ght reduce the number of
fiduci ary duty chall enges somew hat , it wo uld not eliminate them a ltogethe r.
120 f raidin & E anso n . supra note 9, at 1775-78. Fraidin and Hanson's skepticism of judicial
scruti ny close ly paralle ls A lan Schwa rtz 's do u b ts about court eva luat ion of liqu id ate d d amages
prov isions. See Sl<p r a note 58.
121 This is tru e at leas t in a "common vaiues " context, wh e re th e value of the targe t is th e
same for each bidd e r. If, as is likel y, th e target is worth more to some than to o thers, bid ders
would have bidde r-s pecific reservation prices. A court would therefore need to assess the
lockup bidde r's partic CJ!R r valu ation.
122 See Edward B. Rock , Controlling the Dark Side of Re!arional Jnvesiing, 15 C ARDozo L.
REv. 987 , 1010-:12, 1014 (1994) (q uestioning the efficacy of such scrutiny in distinguishing good
and bad relati o nal in vest ing) .
12 3 I d. (conclu ding similarly a bout arrangements be twe en a corporation an d a re la ti onal
investo r).
124 Observe rs have long bee n skeptical of judi cial valuation of a firm. Two obvious exampl es
are corporate la w appraisal ri gh ts and the valuation a court must mak e to determine wh e ther the
absolute priority rule has been satisfied in bankruptcy. See, e.g. , Douglas G . Baird & Thomas H .
Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolure Priority Rule, 55 U. C HI. L.
REv . 738, 779 (1988); Eimer J. Schaefer, The Faliacy of Weighring Asset Value an d Earnings
Value in rhe Appraisal of Corpora te Stock, 55 S. CAL. L. REv . 1031 (1982).
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a court might use these ongoing predictions to supplement the parties'
partisan assessments. Rather than focus on likely reservation prices, a
court might also consider the profits a given bidder has historically
made on acquisitions, or the price other bidders expect from sim ilar
transactions. i 25
Moreo;:er, it is important to keep in mind that courts need only
achieve rough accuracy. 1be d ifficulty of caiculating actua l damages is
precise ly
y patties liquidate damages in many contractual settings,
and as nc,te cl earlier, courts view uncertainty as weighing in fav or of
enforcement T11is same reasoning suggests that courts should presvmptive1y '..: phold any lock up that provides a plausible surrogate fo r
actual d::u:nages. 126
Finally, the prospect of judicial scrutiny, even if it is relatively
inaccurat":, c2.n in crease the parties' in centive to renegotiate an inappropriate lockup. 127 The prospect of judicial scrutiny gives a lockup
bidder much more reason to consider renegotiating a malign an t
lockup than it has if it knows the lockup will be enforced.
In short, while judicial competence would be an issue in a judicial
scrutiny regime, valuation difficulties do not clearly overwhelm the
advantages this ap proach offers in comparison to full enforcement.
Moreover, much of the difficulty disappears if we reconsider what the
appropriate perspective on damages should be.
125 Tnis a pproach suggests intriguing pa rallels to the " new business " rul e in general contract
law. Und e r the new business rule, courts traditionally have refused to awa rd lost profit damages
to a nonbreaching party whose business does not predate th e contract, due to the diffi culty of
projecting what its pro fi ts wo uld have bee n abse nt the breach. See, e.g., Evergreen Amusement
Corp. v. 1Vi il stead, 112 A .2d 901, 904-05 (Md. Ct. App. 1955). Courts inc reasingly have pemlitte d a nonbr eaching party to attempt to prove likely lost profit s in ord e r to give these damages in
an appropriat e case . See Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 372 , 373-74 (Mich . 1976) .

It is also interesting to note that bidde rs appear not to have made large profits in connection
with co rporate acquisitions in the 1980s, thus suggesting that their actual expectancy in terest may
not be great. See, e.g., Michael Bradley et al., Synergisric Gains from Corporare Acquisi1ions and
rheir Division benveen rhe Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FI1'. EcoN. 3 (1988)
(fiuding sta tist ically significant negative returns to bidd e rs) ; Rob:::rta Romano, A Guide to Take overs: Theory , E vidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. O N REG. 119 (1992) (describing empirical
studies and suggesting possible explanations). The existing legal re gime is no doubt at least
partially responsible for bidders' low profits. This is because the existing regime gives targets
substantial lee-wa y against takeovers and enco ura ges a uctions when a co ntrol contest does
develop.
126 Tnus, while :my ana lysis deviates from Ayres's in many respects, I generally agre e with his
suggesti on that courts sho uld focus on whether a lockup is beyond the range of reasonableness.
Ayres, mpra note 8, at 704-05. Fraidin and Hanson may be right th at Ayres 's emphasis on
unmistakabl y excessive lock ups overly re laxes the reason a bleness inquiry, Fraidin & Hanson,
supra note 9, a t 1778-79, but their doubts as to the courts' capacity to engage in meanin gful
re ason ab leness scrutin y seem overstated.

127 For a detailed discussion and game theoretic demonstration of this a rgument in the liquidated damages context, se e Note, Contract Renegotiation, supra note 95.
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A Reliance Approach to Lockups?
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contract generally, and by extension for a liquidated clc\mages provis~on. 1 29 Yet a closer look at ~h e ~or~ tract analysis raises serjoqs: CJ')estlons as to whether exDectat:on IS m fa ct the moper re:rne d 'I .Tt the
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'vVhile expectation is seen as the baseline measure, courts in :manv
cases have long looked to reliance, restitution, and related mea;ures.131 In fact , a strong case can be made that reliance-that is, restoring an innocent party's pre-contract status-would actually be a
superior damages measure if courts awarded all of a promisee's reliance losses, including the value of her foregon e opportunities. 132 In
many cases, including many liquidated damages situations, expectation damages serve as a surrogate for a true reiiance measure . The
assump tion is that, in order to enter into the contract in question, the
promisee bypassed other, equivalent contracting opportunities.133 In
consequence, she should be awarded the net value of such an opportu··
nity- in other words, lost profit.
~

.l

;'I

Cn T

-

j

c,- :

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -·128 Ay res, supra note 8, at 704 -07 ("fully insuring" lockups).
129 See, e.g., RESTATE!<.!ENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 347 cmt. a (1981) ("Contract c!a;·nages
a re ordinarily based on the inju red party's expectation interest."); E. AL!..AN F'ARNS\VO RTI-I,
C m.;TRACTs 40, 812- 13, 839 (1982).
130 As noted earlier, an alternative approach, which Delaware has purported to use in some
cases, would be to focus not only on bidder damages, but also on whether the target recei·ves an
adeq uate quid pro quo for the lockup. See supra note 41. Focusing on bidder compensati on can
be seen as a proxy for such an inquiry and is a much more plausible approach due to the difficul ty in many cases of evaluating the benefits to the target, and to the incentive effects discussed
in this subpart.
131 Fuller and Perdue are perhaps best known for pointing this out in their ciassic definition
and defense of the reliance interest. L.L. Fuller & Willi am R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance lnteresc
in ContraCf Damages, "!-6 YALE L.J. 52 (1936) .
132 Charles J. Goe tz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of
Co ntract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1284, 1287-88 (1980). Goetz and Scott argue that contract law
should seek to maximize the difference between beneficial reliance-the benefits to a promisee
when a contract is performed-and detrimental reliance-the costs to her of breach. This suggests that the optimal damages measure would focus on a promisee's re liance interest, including
any lost opportunities.
133 This is consistent with Fuller and Pe rdue 's view that ex pectation damages are most defen sible in the market setting. Fulle r & Pe1due, supra note 131, at 65-66.
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Perhaps the most striking effect of shifting from general contract
law to the lockup context is the realization that much of the analysis
above simply does not hold true for lockup arrangements. While a
manufacturer who enters into a contract with Supplier A qften forgoes
the opportunity to mak e similar arrangements wi th Supplier B or Supplier C, bidders often do not have other, similar acquisition opportunities during the sam e time frame as their discussions ;,vith the target.
Tne market for similar target corporations is not nearly so extensive ,
or "thick," as the markets that comme ntators tend to assume in their
discussions of contract damages. 134 To be sure, some bidders may
have multiole acouisition possibilities within a particular time frame .
But even these firms may not have an alternative prospect at the same
time; and those prospects they do have are likely to differ in signifi··
cant respects from the target in question. Because bidders often do
not have fore gone opportunities, reliance rather than expectation
more accurateiy compensates a bidder for the costs to it of losing an
acquisition. 13 5
On this view courts should focus on costs- such as the expense of
hiring investment bankers and other experts- that a bidder incurs.
Other costs, such as the cos t of executive time spent on the takeover
bid rather than on other firm business, also en tail reliance costs. 13 6
The analysis above suggests that reliance may be the best standard from the perspective of compensation-that is, it better approximates the real consequences of breach to an initial bidder than an
expectation measure would. Compensation is not the only relevant
factor, however. Contracts scholars have often noted that, in addition
to compensation , the incentive effects of a particular damages measure also must be taken into account. 137 As the analysis below suggests, reliance also is the best measure from the perspective of bidder
and target incentives.
The principal advantage of a reliance measure, as compared to
expectation, is its effect on promisee (bidder, in the lockup context)
1

!.

..

134 Finns such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., whose principal business is engaging in
acquisi tion activity, come somew hat close r to the manufacturer-su pplier illustration, as do industries that a re undergoing rapid consolidation, such as the defense contractin g and information
technology industries in recent years. Yet , both fall we ll short of being truly thick markets.
135 A s the analysis below will show, foc using on a bidder 's reli ance d amages would not e liminate altogether the possibility of including lost profits in the dam ages calculation. Instead,
rath e r than simply assuming lost profits, as the expectation m easure does, reliance shifts the
burden of demonstrating this measure to the nonbreaching party (he re, the bidder).
136 Goetz and Scott refer to this aspect of reliance, which reflects a change in the bidder's
pa tte rn of consumption, as "consequ ential'' reliance. Goetz & Scott, supra note 132, at 1297.
137 See, e.g., Rea, supra note 95, at 152 (stating that dama ge measure must achieve a compromise between optimal insurance and optimal precautions); see also Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort,
Contracr, and Properry: The Model of Precaurion , 73 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985) (noting that compensation can conflict with giving both parti es app ro priate incentives to ta ke precaution).
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incentives. B ecause it assures a bidder the ben efit of the agreement at
han d, expectation gives the bidder inadequate incentives to mi tigate
the consequences of breach by continuing to look for other opportunities.1 38 By contrast, a reliance measure would limit recovery to actual
losses, and thus discourage a bidder fro m overcommitting to any particu lar acquisition.
In contrast to its ben eficial effect on promise e incentives , the re liance measure does not a lwa ys give equally appropriate incentives to a
pr omisor. E ffi cien t breach theorists have long argued , for instance,
t hat because it does not assure the promisee the full ben efit of its bargain, reliance gives a promisor to o great an incentive to breach. O n
this view, expectation offers the advantage of deterring a promisor
from breaching its contract in order to ta ke advantage of an alternative contract unless the new contract is truly superior. 139
Even in the contracts context, this analysis is subject to significant
caveats. While reliance may give a promisor too great an incentive to
breach, for instance, it often gives the promisor superior incentives
with respect to other aspects of the contracting process. 140
More importantly for present purposes , however, there is little
reason to be concerned about "excessive" promisor breach in the
lockup context. The agreement between an initial bidder and a target
is preliminary by its very nature. If a higher valuing bidder emerges,
the parties arguably contemplate-and effi cient breach theory would
encourage-the target's sale to the higher bidder. 'Nhile a reliancebased measure might ap pear to give target managers an incentive to
shift to another bidder even in circumstances where the new bidder
does not value the target more highly, this possibility is far less problematic with respect to corporate control contests than elsewhere. In
contrast to other promisees, the lockup bidder does not simply disappear if another bidder emerges. The lockup bidder still can attempt to
outbid the new bidder, and it is lik ely to succeed unless th e new bid-

138 For an importan t discussion of thi s poin t, and an elabo rate criticism of contract theorists'
trad iti onal assumption that contract doctrine does and should pro vide for strict liability and e;-;pectation dam ages for all breaches, see Geo rge M. Cohen, The Faul£ Lines in Contract Damages,
80 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1994) . '
139 This is because expectation dam ages force a promiso r to fully internalize th e costs of a
brea ch -a promisor will not brea ch unl ess th e p romi so r ca n pay th e promisee the benefit o f its
ba rgain in dam ages and still profit from ent e ring into an alte rnative contract. See, e.g. , A .
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN lNTRODUCfiON TO LAW AND E CONOMICS 33 (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD
A. PosNER, E coNOM IC A NA LYSIS OF LAw 108 (3d ed. 1986). The whole no ti o n o f efficient
breach has itse lf been subject to ex tensiv e criticism. See, e. g., Ian R. Macne il, Efficietu Breach of
Comract: Circles in 1he Sky , 68 VA. L. R Ev. 947 (1982) .
140 See, e.g. , David D. Friedman, An Econom ic Analysis of Alternmive Damage Rules for
Breach of Comract, 32 J.L. & E coN. 281 (1 989) (concludin g that re liance leads to m ore efficient
decisions regarding whethe r and to wh at exte nt to ente r into a contract).

597

T'-TORTH WES T E R I"J U NI V E f{ S I T Y LAV/ RE V I E.VV
1

,

•

•

'

•

•

•

1

h

1

oer places a i11gner value on ttle target-- precJ:;e,y tne context \''h 1ere
"brpach"
wr)•; l d 'f:le aDpropriate 14 1
.. t_, .
Fccu.s in ~~ on a bidder 's reliance damages thus can be se e n as oro~
v1dmg appropnate mcentnres to ooth tne b:,ctcu::r ano tne target m the
b ckup co::~·i:e .:n. 0Jot only does the reliance me asure give the bidder an
incentiY';; !: o anticipate and mitigate any losses should the deal with the
.l. .~

•

, I

. •

'-· .._. • .J.l.-..

(_

t,q
-,. . o p-"r
----~{.") '-" 0..

::;:n

.._

•

•

•

1

-~·-. .,};_. ·r
r\l ~ 0" ,n
_, J'"'~ ,:,- .iJ

--~ · -''·

i

,.,.

•

1

1

1

0

.,

""

,

•

lu- lo.-l?",... t-11
"' l· ·•n. C""TI
't l'VP
-th~
l' c! ··.· lr,o n 1
. . 7e"..)
... ..!. - ~
......, _
....,.
l l .i . . . L•·t. ~.-o"l
t \ ....d .... L ~ _ .,_,. .,._ ,
..._'1

r:l

U.

0

I.

·l-a-:--.t ,S•::,..
r; : : l ·'J.·

.

·r',.. tJ
-

S 1l.~'l("•
J'1 1( 1 0 D"" a·,-na '"·- c.
,-.,.. ,., .. .:.'o h ·
. .J L ! ~ ..__1.!..\.,... ~.L.!.I..,.... ;l ~~ v, C .JLS I,), ~::~ l j

bidder
-·
'
cc.n 2.ls c· [:-,::; seen as desirable rather than pr ob le~l ati c .l-'' 2
1
d t'
•
i
if.\ .',; CW;c;),SSl::m t HUS laf nas a G ~ r e sse ·, cfle ~ppro pnme Gai~1a ge s
.. ..,c, r,.,,u....•
"(l b
ocnoral
Ae
~: "'flt "'
·> 'n o pa···"
•~ Lll a'·
. "' l"'f'l'·'
_."._,,j ~·,__!.< -y· _] ......
.... .
l rm
_ .::l'
1.1. ou ~L .l·0'''1'0::1 '\ G i"''1
• . i. r ""
1
0 v .1.
'
('
1...,
'
"k
f£
.
h
.
..
De TJ. <::J.l tS tuat 1 o;.::,'ups m ay o 1er m t ,e corporate acqm srt10n context.
Yet, the z,tgurilent for a reliance a pproach rernains equally powerful
once these be n efits are taken into accoun t. In the co nventional view,
lockups serve to encourage a bidder to participate in bidding by assuring the bidder that its costs will be compensated. A t least if construed
to include bo th pre-bid and subsequent expenses, as it sho uld be, t his
is exactly what a reliance m easure is design ed to do.143 The r eliance
measure also should counteract the problems of parties' diffe ring expectations, or of a bidder 's hesitancy to enter an auction, sin ce repaym ent of costs should be sufficie nt to entice a reluctant bidd er to bid
for the targe t. To be sure, a bidder might be concerned about truly
receiving all of its costs in either of these situations. B u t so long as
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141 Anot he r concern abo ut the reliance standard is th at it may ca use a bidd er to ove rrelythat is, to invest too many resources in th e contract- beca use all such expenditures can be recove red in the event of a bre ach. Steven Shavell, D amage lV/e(lsures for Breach of Comracr, 11
BELL J. Eco;'l. 466, 472 (1980); see also Coote r, supm note 137, at 30-31 (a rguing that liqu idated
dama ges provisions iimit ove rreli ance by m aking damages invarian t to the amo unt of re liance) .
But courts <::an and do co un te ract any such ince nti ve by using the mi ti ga ti on , foreseeab ilit y, and
certainty doct rir-.es to disallow excessive o r inapprop riate expenditii res. Co hen, supra not e 138,
at 12i~ 9 ; W. Davi d Slawson , The Role of Reliance in Contract Damages , 76 CORNELL L. REv. 197,
230 -31 (1990) . lt is also inte resting to n ote that these sam:: limita ti ons freq ue nt ly lead courts to
avva rd what is in effect reliance damages even when they purport to appl y an expecta tio n measure. Th at is, the mitiga ti on, fo reseea bility, and certain ty !imitations tend to m ove th e recove ry
away Irom expectation and to wa rd reliance. Cohen, supra n ote 138, at 1249.
142 A recent article by G eorge Coh en pa rallels the ana lysis above in ma ny respe cts. Co hen
suggests th at reliance is attractive where promi see incentives a re a greate r co ncern than opport unis tic breac h by the promiso r. Cohen, supra note 138, at 1309-10. Th is seems tru e of corpo rate
lockups. ln the particular contex t of "supe rior alte rn at ives," Cohen argues tha t re li ance dam ages a re approp riate if the promisor is be tte r situated to ta ke ad vantage of a superio r alte rnative,
where as expectation or higher damages a re a pp ropriate (since they chiil the promiso r's incent ive
w bread1) if the proiT'i see can better m ake the alternative sale . Cohen, supra note 138, a t 12971302. In the lockup context, the target a rguably is the m o re appropriate seller due to th e
probl ems wi th bidde r resale discusse d in Part III.
143 In other contracts contex ts, the qu estion whet her courts should award p re-con tract reliance is a matter of dispute. As the text suggests, the nonnat ive case fo r including pre -con tract
re liance is pa1ticu!arly strong in the lock up context, given that compensati ng a bid de r fo r its
costs is an impo rt ant goal of lockups.
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co urts are generous in upholding lockups that provide a plausi b1e estimation of costs, this concern is easily addressed.
·while several of Ihe benefits Fraidin and Hanson a!: tri blt !:E: to
lockups mi ght seem m ore difficult to achieve under a reliance-b2sed
fram ework , th e real value of each of the benefits is high ly questionable, as discussed earlie r. For ins tance, a reliance-based lock up ar;:!:Uably vvou1d no t encourage as much search by a poten tial biclcl·~; r as ~Jn e
that gtic.ranteed the bid der its expectancy interest in t.h~ -~ven.:: that 8.
higher valuing bidd er e merge d, 144 since t he beneJh to u·;_e b idder
v.;ou ld be substant iall y lower. Ye t this adve rse impact 0::1 a bidder's
incen tive to act as a "sales agent" does not seem particuJar1y problcrnc
n
at1c, g1ven tn at tne target W L"[1t mte
n b
· e a t Jeas t as e:necu· ve 8, :-;e;uer
as
the bid de r, an d the bidde r still has an incentive to seek OUJ o cher bidders after it has acq uired the target.l 45 Moreover, lockups can underm ine as we ll as enhance se arch, since target m anagers can atter:n pt to
use them to thwart an u nd esired bidder. Similarly, a reliance -bas ed
a pproach would preclude th e bidder and the target from using a
lockup collusively, in order to divert some of a higher valuing bidd er's
p rofits, but the risk that such a lockup would have malignant, ra ther
than beneficial, effects raises doubts as to whether this is a desirable
locku p goa l in any event. 146
A final possible concern is the effect that a reliance m easure
would have on the parties ' use of a lockup to counter risk aversion.
R ecall that a lockup can be used to allocate risk in th e event that
either the lockup bidder or the target is, or both are, risk averse .1 47
E ven here, it is questionable whether greater than reliance d amages
are likely to be necessary. First, the principal role for a risk aversionbased lockup would be to address the bidder's risk aversio n ,148 and it
is not clear ho w serious a concern bidder risk aversion is or shot:ld b·~ .
G iven the amounts a t stake, a bid der may have concerns as to 'Nh e ther
the acquisition of the target will prove profitable , as Fraidin and H anson suggest. 149 But these concerns seem most significan t af ter the ac•

14 4
145
146
147

•

1

1

~r

See sub part LC (lockups as enco uraging search) .
See supra not es 107-08 and accompanying text.
See subpa rt II. B (effects of collusion).
See subpa rt LB.

14 8 While a lockup also co uld be used to res pond to target risk aversion, see Frai din & H anso n, supra not e 9, at 1823, a simple r and more direct response to target risk a ve rsion wo ul d be to
include a liquidated damages provision giving the larger a specified amount of dam ages in the
e vent th e bidde r breac hes th e parti es' agree me nt. Moreover, beca use ta rget share holde rs usua ll y
can div e rsify th e ir po rtfolio, they should not be risk averse. To th e extent that the ta rget 's manage rs are risk ave rse due to th e ir concentrated investment in th e ta rget, limi ting lock ups to the
bidder's reliance inte rest may help curb the managers ' tend ency to act on th eir risk av e rsi on to
th e detriment o f sha re hold e rs.
149 Fraidin & Hanson, supra n ote 9, at 1823 (citing R. P rest on l\kAfee & Jo hn McMill an,
A uctions and Bidding, 25 J. EcoN . Lrr . 699, 726 (1987)) (suggesting th at pa rt ies are m ore risk
ave rse when they have substanti a l perce ntage of their assets at st ake) .
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D istinctions Between Initial and Subsequent Bidder Lockups

TI1e analysis thus far has considered lockups in general terms ,
without focusing on when in the acquisition process, and to whom, the
target grants a lock up. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish at least
two ki.:lds of lockups. Targets grant some lockups to the first bidder,
often in connection with an agreement reached in the absence of any
other bidder. O ther lockups can be described as second or subsequent bidder lockups. Tnese lockups often are granted in response to
a hostile bid by an initial bidder, and the managers of a target may use
such a lockup to entice another bidder into the bidding.
Subsequent bidder lockups arguably are more likely to be m alignant than initial bidder lockuos.151 Because an initial bidder's costs
may exceed those of subsequent bidders, an initial bidder arguably has
more need for locku p protection. 152 By contrast, target managers can
use subsequent bidder lockups to subsidize a challenge by a friendly
bidder , and thus to thwart a hostile initial bidder.1 53
O ne possible question these observations raise is whether the distinctions among lockups undermine the attractiveness of applying a
.t

150 No tice that this analysis also raises interesting qu estions as to whether expectation damages are an appropriate yardstick in oth er liquidated damages contexts. Because the promisee
often will have foregone similar opportunities when it entered into the contract, expect ation
damages frequentl y will be appropriate. But this may not always be the case, as th e lockup
context makes c!ear.
151 See Kahan & Klausn er, supra note 10 (reaching a similar conclusion about subsequent and
initial bidd er lockups) .
152 Other bidders may fr ee -ride on the initial bidd er's efforts to .i dentify the target as a good
candidate for takeover, for instance. The initial bidd er may therefore have sunk costs that a
subsequent bidder would not need to incur.
153 Notice that such lockups have th e chilling effect on incentives to search that were discussed in Part I.
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reliance damages approach to all lockups. For at least two reasons,
they do not. First, not all initial bidder lockups are benign, since target managers can use an initial bidder lockup not only to encourage
an initial bi dder but also to preempt any subsequent, potentially hostile bid.1 54 Simil arl y, beca use subsequent bidder lockups can be used
to encourage competitive bidding, they a re not always malignant fr om
target shareholders' perspe clive. A n im portan t attraction of tbe reliance damages approach is that it m edi a tes among the benefits and
po tential problems wit h lock ups . The reliance damages measure is restrictive enough to im pose significant li mits on the parties' ability to
use lockups in a n inappropriat e fas hion, yet it does not underm ine the
beneficial use of lockups.
Second, the reliance damages meas ure could easily be used to account for the general differe nces between initial and subsequent bidder lockups. Courts could apply the standard more flexibly in the
initial bidder context than with subsequent bidders , for instance, by
ap plying a more stringent presumption against recovery of opportunity costs in the subsequent bidder context, or even by limiting subsequent bidders to reimbursement costs. One suspects that courts
would make at least some adjustments of this sort, much as they do in
applying the reliance measure in contract law generally. 1 ss It is iniportant not to overstate the usefulness of this flexibility, however. A major difficulty in scrutinizing corporate lockups is that courts often
cannot easily determine whether a particular lockup (or category of
lockups) is malignant, and even problematic lockups may offer appreciable benefits. One of the most important advantages of the reliance
damages approach, and of assessing all lockups in reliance terms, is
that it minimizes the need for courts to make difficult determinations
as to the nature of the parties' motives in any given case.
E.

Summary and an Application: the Proposed Scheme

The foregoing analysis suggests a simple reliance damages model
of judicial scrutiny, comprised of two distinct steps. vi/hen a lockup
arrangement is challenged, a court should b egin with the duty of loyalty issue. If the lockup can be traced directly to a side deal or other
154 Param ount may we ll have bee n an exam ple of this, given Pa ramount 's di rectors ' ap parent
desire to thwart QVC. See Pa ramou nt Commun icati ons, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. , 637 A. 2d
34 , 39 (Del. 1994) (discussing effo rts by Paramount to discourage QVC from m aking a bid).
155 See, e.g., C ohen, supra not e 138, at 1249-51 (discussing devices th at can be used to limit
re liance, such as denial of lost opportunities an d use of reasonableness, foreseeability, ce rtainty,
and mitigation limitati ons).
Similarly , one can imagine courts appl ying a measure other t han reliance in a trul y e xceptional case. Yet, the particular dynamics of lockups and the corporate acqu isition con tex t so
regu larly will call for a reliance standard that a strong presumption in fav or of relian ce is warrant ed. The number of cases whe re anoth e r sta nd ard wo uld be app rop ri ate wo uld , in my opinion, be extremely small.
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overt violation of loyalty, it should be voided altogether.l 56 In the
ab sence of an overt violation, however, courts should shift from loy:cilcy to the second reliance damages step, a determination whether the
lclClu lp reflects a reasonable stipulation of the bidder's likely reliance
losses should the deal fall through . If courts do award more than an
iniiial bidder's out-of-pocket and related costs, they should do so only
if
bidder can demonstrate an actual or high ly probable opportu-;u l:J ss. Given the uncertainty as to actual damages, 157 courts should
uphold any lockup that reflects a credible es timation of damages as of
th e tirne of the parties' agreement, as they do in other liquidated dam?-·c·
CJ P <' <',P .l' ·t J' n 'JC
v .J ...... ·~
. .t ~ u ~ ·

O ther than the shift in damages measure, the most significant
chartge :)uggested by the reliance approach arises when the target's
mana.gers have not overtly violated their duty of loyalty (i.e. , the
lockup passes the initial scrutiny), but a court invalidates the lockup as
excessive at the reliance damages stage. Courts and commen tators
currently hold that a bidder is not entitled to any compensation whatsoever if its lockup is struck down. As noted above, this ali-or-nothing
approach seriously undermines the benefit to a lockup bidder. A better approach would permit the bidder to demonstrate its actual, provable damages if the lockup is disallowed, just as promisees with
liquidated damages provisions may do in other contractual settings.
Because lockups typically are challenged at the preliminary injunction stage, giving a bidder its actual damages when a lockup is
struck down raises a question as to whether a court should calculate
these damages at the time of the initial challenge, or thereafter. The
simplest answer is that a court need only decide whether or not to
uph-old the lockup (and what kinds of damages it intends to allow) at
trie preliminary injunction stage. Actual damages can be determined
after the sale of the target is final. To be sure, postponing the determination would create uncertainty for other bidders as to how much the
lockup bidder must be paid. But there would be no need ever to
make the determination if the lockup bidder eventually won out, 158
and the uncertainty would not be great.
156

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

15 7 r.;Ia ny of the costs that a bidder al ready has incurred a re relative ly ce rtain ; howeve r the

p atties ordinarily wi ll not know what additional expenses to ex pect , because th ey cannot predict
with accuracy wha t additional costs th e initial bidder will incur if a new bidde r emerges.
l5 8 The Paramount takeove r contest is an obvious example of how this could happen. See
Param ou nt Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); see also QVC
Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc. 635 A.2d 1245 (De l. C h. 1993). A lth oug h
Vi acom's initial me rger agreement (including its lock up provisions) was struck down , Viacom
still eventually won the auction. Had th e De laware Supreme Co urt adopted the approach in the
tc::xt, there would have been no need to determine Vi acom's actual compensation. The facts of
the Paramount contest are ex plored in greate r detail at th e en d of this section.
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Two final q uestions also warrant brief discussion. The first is how
courts should treat lockup arrangements that include multiple partsfor instance , one designed to insure some or all of the b idder 's profits,
and ano ther that covers the bidder's out-of-pocket costs . 159 Delaware
has tended to strike all of the provisions if the court conclu des that the
arrangement as a whole is excessive .160 H owever, it appears more
sensible to uphoi d a reas onable termination fe e even if the stock
lockup is struck down as unwarranted, at least if it is clear that the t-vvo
rn::::asures are in tended to cover different aspects of a bid der's potential losses.
Second , initial bidders often buy a little less th an ten percent of a
target's stock in order to hedge their bet prior to ma kL.1 g a bid. An
obvious ques tion in this context is wh ether a court shoul d take into
account in its assessment of the initial bidder's lockup any profits an
initial bidder makes by eventually selling these shares to a higher bid d er.1 61 The ans wer clearly is yes. If the initial bidder received both
t hese profits and full reliance damages un der its locku p, even a reliance-based lockup would overcompensate the initial bidder for its
losses. In a sense, then, an initial bidder 's stock purchase can be seen
as a form of precontract mitigation that a court sho uld incorpo rate
in to its analysis .162
To better appreciate how the approach would work in a more
concrete setting, consider the facts of the P aramount a cquisition in
greater detail. The lockup Paramount agreed to consisted of a $100
million te rmination fee, together with an option to purchase slightly
iess than twenty percent of Paramount's stock at the price of Viacom's
bid in the event Paramount abandoned the merger agreement for another bid. In con trast to the Delaware Supreme Court decision ,
159 Whil e the parti es usually employ stock or asset lock ups to guarantee a bidder 's p rofi ts,
and fix ed fees to cover its costs, multipart lockups could also be structured in other ways.
160 A tension betwee n th e chancery and supreme court decisions in Paramount casts inte resting light on this. The chancery court struck down Viacom 's stock lockup but uph el d the $100
million te tmination fee that wo uld have covered, amon g o th er things, Viacom's costs. QVC
Network, Inc. v. Paramo unt Communicati ons, Inc., 635 A.2d at 1270 -73. Pa ramoun t did not
appeal th e decision to uphold the termination fee, but th e supreme court suggested that it would
also have struck this fee down had the issue been appealed. Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
QVC Ne twork, Inc. , 637 A. 2d 34, 50-51 ; see also Bainbridge, supra no te 8, at 327-32 (arguing
that lock up provisions should be tak en as a whole).
161 My th anks to Ed Rock for bringing this issue and some of its implicati ons to my attenti on.
162 From another pers pective, the stock purchase could be seen as a bidde r's means of hedging agai nst its reliance costs. See generally Cooter, supra n ote 137, at 16 (no ting that mitigation
and reliance are "identical but for tim e") . Another issue is whether an initial bidder should be
"req uired " to engage in this form of mitigation-that is , whe ther co urts sho uld conside r th e
possibility of prebid stock purchases even if the bidd er has not engaged in them. Th e answe r
here would ap pear to be no, give n, among other things , th e difficulty of determining how m uch
stock a bi dd er might real istically have purchased while still keeping its intended acqu isition
secret.
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which suggested that the magnitu de of the stock lockup and the
tainted nature of Paramount's decision-making pro-::ess required that
the lockup be voided altogether, 163 a court rnight o,vc:L L~phold the termination fee under a reliance approach. The $100 m illion fee was explicitly designed to compensate Viacom for its expected out-of-pocket
and related costs and, while perhaps on the generous si de.; can be seen
as a p lausible projection of Viacom 's costs. 164
By contrast, the reliance model would only upr:o1c1 e:dditional
.
'
.
.
,. .,
1
1
compensatwn-nere,
t he stoc k opt10n
portiOn
()J: ':lle ,oc,-::1..> p-n
Viacom could demonstra te that its negotiations and. ;:c g:reement forc ed
it to forgo other opportunities that would h ave both come to fruition
and produced profits roughly equiva lent to the likely value of the
lockup. Interestingly, Viacom appears to have m ade an argument of
this sort in its negotiations with Paramount. Nevertheless, it seems
doubtful that Viacom could show that it did in fact fo rgo similar opportunities during the same time frame .165 On the contrary, the Paramount deal was a singular event from Viacom 's persp ective.l 66 Thus,
a court would uphold the termination fee but not Viacom 's stock
option. 167
As this illustration suggests, the most dramatic practical difference between the reliance approach and an expectancy-based or
universal enforcement regime is that stock options and similar arrangements would be more difficult to justify. In order to invoke a
lockup that extended well beyond its likely out- of-pocket costs, a bidder would have to show that it gave up other, similar o p portunitiesthat is , that the lockup was designed to compensate real losses. As
noted earlier, such a case would be strongest in an ind ustry rhat is
undergoing rapid consolidation.16 8
'r

! 63 Paramourzr, 637 A.2d at 50-51.

164

Vice Chancellor Jacobs took a similar view of the te rmin a ti on fee in his chancery court
decision in Paramoun1. 635 A.2d at 1271.
165 In addi tion to th e compensation-related foc us on io5t opportuni tie:s, the goal of giving
Viacom appropriate mitigation incentives would also counsel against upho lding the stock option.
166 Note also that , although Viacom was the first bidder-and ini tial bidder lock ups generally
are less problematic th an lockups to subsequent bidders-Paramoun t 's dire•: tors clearly wished
to preempt a QVC bid. Under such circumstances, co urts shou ld be pa rticularly hesitant to
award lost opportunity costs. See supra subpart IV.D.
167 Notice that this analysis suggests the Delaware Chancery Court reached a more sensible
resul t than the Delaware Supreme Court in the actual case. See supra notes 160 & 164.

168 The Delaware Supreme Court ex pressed particular concern abo ut the parties' failure to
impose a cap on the value of th e stock option. Paramount, 637 A .2d at 39. Caps are much more
the exception than th e norm in practice. See, e.g., Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 9, at 1761.
Tnus, while the court's outrage was puzzling to many observe rs, capping a stock option would be
one way for a bidder to enhance enfo rceabi lity under the reliance approach. E ven if it could not
make a compelling case as to lost opportunities, a bidder co uld use such an option for a limited
profit in th e event th e target 's managers ultimately so ld th e target to anot her bidder.
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The reliance model described in this section would not be perfect.
Ye t , it offers a coherent approach to corporate lockups that avoids
r:1any of t!:1e pitfalls both of the existing case law, and of a world where
1
•
cc,r.Ets em:orce every ,ocKup.
e

CoNCLUSION

Hanson make a pmverful case for blanket enforcean d in the process reveal serious fl aws in both
crea tm ,~nt and previous commentators' analysis of these orovi~ 1on s . Full enforcen:tent proves much more problematic on inspection ,
hc,x ever, than Fraidin and Hanson's optimistic assessment of market
behavior leads them to conclude. Not onlv does a reliance dama~es
-approach like the one proposed seem more attractive normatively
than unb linking enforcement, but also, given the inevitability that
courts will engage in some kind of scrutiny in order to prevent the
process problems that excessive lockups would inevitably create, it is
far more realistic from a descriptive perspective .
The reliance damages approach suggests that, while continuing to
su bject lockups to judicial oversight, Delaware courts should change
their approach in several important respects. Most importantly,
rather than simply treating lockups as part of the overall issue of directorial loyalty in the takeover context, Delaware courts should separate the loyalty and damages inquiries. Nor, in the absence of an
overt duty of loyalty violation, should courts focus upon issues such as
whether the lockup confers a "substantial benefit" on the target.1 69
R ather , courts should assess whether the lockup is a reasonable estimate of a bidder's damages, measured in reliance terms. If a court
strikes down a lockup as excessive, a bidder still should be entitled to
prove irs ?tctual damages.
The analysis of this Article also has i..'Ilportant implications for
corporate law scholarship generally. The contractarian analysis of
corporation issues has proved extraordinarily fruitful in the last decade. T he insights it has made possible are difficult to dispute, despite
the fact that, as has often been pointed out, contractarian scholars frequently employ a limited, even simplistic view of contract. 170 As this
F\:rticle has attempted to demonstrate in the particular context of corporate lockups, a more systematic and nuanced consideration of the
nature of corporate contracting may offer a new round of insights into
the problems of corporate law.
•
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169 See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1988). For
Fraidin and Hanson's discussion of some of this approach's problems, see Fraidin & Hanson,
supra note 9, at 1748-54.
170 'Nilli8.m Bratton is perhaps best known for this critique. William W. Bratton, Jr., The
"Nexus of Ccnrrac!s" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 Co~'ELL L. REv. 407 (1989).
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